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Abstract
One of themost contentious political issues in postcolonial India is the unfulfilled
project of a ‘uniform civil code’ which would override the existing ‘personal
laws’ or religion-based laws of domestic relations, inheritance and religious
institutions. If the personal laws are admitted to be preserved (if somewhat
distorted) remnants of ‘religious laws’, then the legitimacy of state intervention
is called into question, especially since the Indian state claims to be secular.
This paper, by discussing the history of the lesser-known Christian personal law,
demonstrates that this conundrum is of considerable heritage. From the earliest
days of British imperial rule in India, the quest to establish a universal body of law
conflicted with other legal principles which upheld difference: that of religion,
as well as race. It was the historical role of Indian Christians to occasion legal
dilemmas regarding the jurisdictions of British and ‘native’ law, and concurrently
about the identity of people subject to those different laws. In trying to discover
who the Indian Christians were, and what laws ought to apply to them, British
judges had perforce to reflect on who the ‘British’ were, whilst also dealing with
conflicting collective claims made by Hindus, Muslims, Parsis, and Christians
themselves about their own identity and religious rights. The Indian Christian
personal law was an unintended by-product of this process, a finding which throws
light both on the dynamics of colonial legislation, and on the essentially modern
nature of Indian personal laws.
A hapless husband
In 1870, a man called Zabardast Khan filed for divorce in the district
court of Farrukhabad, a north Indian city. His grounds were desertion
and adultery by his wife, and he filed his case under the newly enacted
Indian Divorce Act (Act IV of 1869), which was the first statutory
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divorce law of the country.1 Despite the language of the legal case (i.e.
desertion, adultery), Khan’ story was not that of a cuckolded husband,
but that of a religious convert caught in personal, social and legal
conflicts. Both Khan and his wife were born Muslims, and married as
such. Some years after their marriage, they converted to Christianity
under the aegis of the American Presbyterian mission. Later, Khan’s
wife decided to revert to Islam, and subsequently to marry another
Muslimman. Khan returned his wife’s dower, signifying the end of his
relationship with her under Muslim law, and filed for divorce.
In spite of his apparently reasonable plea, Khan lost his case. The
district judge felt that the case required the greater expertise of
the High Court judges, and the case was transferred accordingly.
The High Court of North-Western Provinces at Allahabad found
that the Indian Divorce Act could not apply to this case, since that
statute was ‘intended to apply to such marriages as are recognized
as marriages by Christians, and not to polygamous contracts, such as
are the unions known as marriages to the Mahomedan law.’ Khan
was Christian and had married only once, but it was true that he
had married under Muslim law, and could have been polygamous had
he remained Muslim.2 This placed his marriage beyond the scope of
British matrimonial law and of the Indian Divorce Act, which was
based on the former. As far as Muslim law was concerned, Maulvi
Asadullah Khan, earlier Qazi al-Qazat of the Sadr court of North-
Western Provinces, now Subordinate Judge,3 opined on consultation
that by Muslim law Zabardast Khan was separated from his wife the
1 As opposed to traditional provisions withinMuslim personal law, as well as various
Hindu caste rules.
2 The notion of ‘potentially polygamous’ marriage, invalid under British law, was
a description that applied even when parties were in fact monogamous. The concept
remained operative in Britain as late as 1995, until by the Private International Law
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 (1995 c 42) s. 5, marriages of persons domiciled
in England andWales performed abroad under laws that permitted polygamy, became
valid, provided that polygamy was not actually committed. Halsbury’s notes on the law
referred to Muslim marriages, performed under Muslim personal law abroad, and
the case of Hussein versus Hussein (1983) Fam. 26 in particular. Halsbury’s Statutes of
England and Wales, (4th edn, London: Butterworths, 2006), Vol. 27, pp. 640–641. The
consequences of this legal doctrine were very different for Christians in Britain and
in India, as this paper will show.
3 British Indian courts had Muslim and Hindu law specialists attached to them, in
consultative capacity, until such offices were abolished by the ActXI of 1864. However
consultation of ‘expert witnesses’, especially where Muslim law was concerned,
continued into the early twentieth century. M.P. Jain, Outlines of Indian Legal History
(4th edn, Bombay: N.M. Tripathi, 1981), p. 467.
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moment he had converted, because by Muslim law an apostate was
considered socially dead. But the judges could not let Zabardast Khan
avail of the provision of Muslim law either, because he was at the
time of the suit a Christian, and had filed his case under the Indian
Divorce Act.4 Bigamy was a criminal offence for Christians,5 so Khan
was effectively excluded from marital life until his ex-wife died.
Since the situation was an oppressive one for the principal
protagonist, one might be tempted to explain it with reference to
deliberate oppression. And since Indian Christians were a small
religious minority in India then, as now, the larger religious groups
would provide themost satisfying oppressors, themajoritarian agenda
being sustained by a colonial British government (and British judges
influenced by state imperatives) seeking to secure political security
at the expense of religious freedom. In fact, the very few scholars
who have attempted to analyse the legal experience of Indian
Christians in British India have attributed primary agency to the
British government and its political imperatives. Gauri Viswanathan
argues that this agency consisted of forcibly applying Hindu personal
laws to those Hindus who had converted to Christianity, thereby
frustrating their efforts to choose their religious identity. She
argues that the British government’s motive for doing so derived
from the essentially political nature of religious conversions, which
simultaneously subverted the self-congratulatory secular national
culture emerging in nineteenth-century Britain, and the rigid religio-
legal identities imposed in empire.6 In response, ChandraMallampalli
questions Viswanathan’s premise that Indian converts to Christianity
did not wish to have Hindu (or other) personal laws applied to
them. Underlining that Christian doctrines do not advocate any
particular rules of inheritance, he demonstrates that IndianChristians
often claimed the right to continue in their pre-conversion personal
law. I believe that Mallampalli takes a much more accurate view
regarding the motivations of Indian Christians; in addition, I think
that Viswanathan’s analysis of Abraham is flawed, because she fails
4 Zaburdust Khan versus his wife, N.W. Provinces High Court Reports, Vol. II (Allahabad:
N.W. P. Government Press, 1870), pp. 370–379.
5 Unlike all other Indian males, except Parsis, after the passing of the Parsi
Marriage and Divorce Act, XV of 1865.
6 Gauri Viswanathan, Outside the Fold: Conversion, Modernity and Belief (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 75–117. Chandra Mallampalli, Christians and
Public Life in Colonial South India 1863–1937: Contending with Marginality (London:
Routledge, 2004), pp. 21–80, especially with regard to inheritance laws, pp. 38–58.
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to take into account the Indian Succession Act of 1865, which was
legislated two years after Abraham, with the intention of providing
a uniform inheritance law for Indian Christians thereafter. If the
colonial government played an insidious role in this context, it
certainly did not consist of denying Christians a distinct personal law.
Howdid this new inheritance law, an important part of the emerging
Christian personal law, come about? Mallampalli, who is aware of the
novelty of Christian personal law itself, suggests that it was largely
an arbitrary imposition: the new inheritance law, and indeed the
entire personal law for Indian Christians, consisting of laws regarding
marriage, divorce, inheritance and guardianship, was created by the
British rulers because of their misplaced effort to rescue converts
from social oppression, as well as their rigid view of Indian religious
identities. The effect of such state action was the isolation of Indian
Christians from the rest of Indian society, and their marginalization.
My analysis is different; while I concur with Mallampalli that the
Christian personal law of India did not emerge as a result of demands
from Indian Christians themselves, I cannot fully subscribe to the view
that it was a unilateral creation by the colonial government.
For example, Mallampalli himself pays a great deal of attention
to social conflicts derived from religious change, especially between
increasingly nationalized Hindus, and those who were deemed to have
‘deserted’ their families and nation by converting to Christianity. But
he does not connect his narration of socio-political contests with the
history of legislation—never asking, for example, whether the colonial
government could have continued to applyHindu andMuslimpersonal
laws to those who had become Christian, given that the families of
such ‘converts’ refused to allow them a share in familial estates. Such
exclusion from kinship and property entitlements was perpetrated by
personal violence as well as by legal battles, all closely watched by the
increasingly ‘nationalized’ Hindu and Muslim religious communities.
The exercise of imperial power was in the last resort coercive, but this
did not preclude systematic efforts at creating consensus, among other
things by ostentatiously ‘preserving’ the religious laws of Indians. This
paper deals with legal efforts in British-ruled India to reconcile two
legal and political principles: the principle of preserving indigenous
laws, which had developed as a colonial tradition from the late-
eighteenth century, and the principle of religious freedom, which
came to the fore in the early-nineteenth century due to the appeals
of Christians (European and Indian), and was later appropriated by
other religious communities in India. I argue that the result of this
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legal conflict was not simply an expedient division of legal spheres:
indigenous law in the private sphere and English law or its derivatives
in the public sphere,7 but a complex and unstable legal system,
constantly evolving through the interaction betweenBritish legal ideas
and a variety of competing Indian legal claims. One by-product of this
process was the novel Christian personal law.
This is not, however, a narration of the mathematical resolution of
legal puzzles: it is a social and political history, and an analysis of how
certain legal principles were adopted by a range of Indian actors to
assert their claims on the state. Above all, it is a history of Indian
Christians, one that attempts to look beyond the usual narrative of
victimization and resistance. It is true that Indian Christians occupied
a subaltern position within a number of hierarchies: within their own
racially ordered churches, within the emerging Indian nation, and for
dalit Christians, within their caste-divided community. For that very
reason, and because the notion of a homogenous subaltern agency and
consciousness is much more difficult for historians of India to accept
today than it was twenty years back, it is worth examining how ‘Indian
Christians’ became just that—Indian Christians, in a period when the
7 David Washbrook encapsulated the dynamic tension produced by this division by
referring to the ‘Janus-faced’ nature of the colonial legal system, which, by embedding
ascribed status in personal/private law, hobbled the possibility of an homogenous
rule of law even in the public realm, particularly with regard to property rights.
Washbrook’s analysis of Indian personal law is much more historically situated than
that of most legal scholars, including Derrett, whose work he relied upon. David
Washbrook, ‘Law, State and Agrarian Society in Colonial India’ in Modern Asian
Studies, Vol. 15, No. 3 (1981), pp. 649–721; J. D. M. Derrett, Religion, Law and the
State in India (2nd edn, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999). The present
paper highlights issues that Washbrook did not contend with, firstly, the ubiquity of
status in public law, not simply as a spillover from the personal law, but inherently,
through the implication of racial difference. Elizabeth Kolsky has pointed to the
claim made by white supremacists that they were entitled to a distinct criminal
procedure as a ‘personal law’. Elizabeth Kolsky, ‘Codification and the Rule of Colonial
Difference: Criminal Procedure in British India’ in Law and History Review, Vol. 23,
No. 3 (September 2005), pp. 631–683. This paper attempts to connect the realms of
public and private law, and the apparently distinct legal claims to racial and religious
status by narrating the history of such persons who simultaneously invoked all these
categories: the Indian Christians. Secondly, due to the nature of the questions asked,
Washbrook’s analysis had little time for tracing the ideological differences among
British legislators and judges regarding the legal approach to religious difference.
This is the subject of the present paper, which also draws on recent discussions of the
theme in Lauren Benton,Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes inWorldHistory, 1400–
1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); and Robert Travers, Ideology
and Empire in Eighteenth-Century India: the British in Bengal (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2007).
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idea of India was being intellectually and politically negotiated, at the
same time as nation-like religious communities were being imagined.8
The distinctiveness of the history of Christian personal law (as
opposed to the other personal laws) lies in its overlap with the history
of racial demarcation in India. Religious status and matrimonial law
being inseparable in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century British law,
early legislation about Christianmarriage in India consisted of British
concerns about their owndomestic and property relations.During such
legal episodes, when English ecclesiastics, law lords and Parliament
ploughed in, Indians remained marginal to the legislating vision,
even if Indian Christians were the majority of people to whom a
Christian marriage law would apply. But the conflation of race and
religion was uncomfortable, especially because of the vocal presence of
missionaries who constantly produced petitions regarding the plight of
Indian Christians, which could prove embarrassing political material
back in Britain. The government was also highly aware that there were
people whose lives and genealogies undermined binary categorizations
of ‘British’ or ‘native’. Through their very lives, Armenians, India-
born Portuguese, Indo-Portuguese, and Anglo-Indians9 as well as
converts from Hinduism, Islam and Zoroastrianism, forced the state
to repeatedly consider the nature of racial distinctiveness, which
underwrote the hierarchical order of civic status within the colonial
legal and political systems.
Other than competition between the emerging Indian religious
communities, and British efforts to resolve the question of their
own identity, there was a third factor that shaped the Indian
Christian personal law, and this consisted of negotiation of the legal
system by Christians themselves. From the eighteenth century until
recent times, Christians in India did claim (unlike what Mallampalli
would have us believe) distinct laws based on religious and/or
8 Benedict Anderson’s notion of the modern community appears eminently
applicable not only to those collectives which emerged as nation-states, but also to
religious collectives with similar territorial vision which did not in all cases coincide
with a national reality. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin
and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983).
9 In the contemporary sense of a child of a British father and an Indian mother,
rather than British expatriates in India, although these two social categories were
not nearly as distinct as the latter desired them to be. See Elizabeth Buettner’s
discussion of how the ‘return’ of British children for education to Britain, was essential
for securing their ‘white’ identity. ‘“Not Quite Pukka”: Schooling in India and the
Acquisition of Racial Status’, in Elizabeth Buettner, Empire Families: Britons and Late
Imperial India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 72–109.
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racial status. Such claims were sometimes made collectively, and
especially from the second half of the nineteenth century, such claims
provided unifying agendas for new territorially-spread community
organizations with significant lay leadership and participation. These
‘communal’ demands were shaped in the existing language of personal
laws and community rights which appeared intelligible to a large
number of Indians and British in the late nineteenth century. But
the paradox for Indian Christians was their need to combine their
claim to distinctiveness with that of multiple belonging, which alone
gave substance to the right of free, i.e. unpunished religious choice.
Because if a convert fromHinduism or Islam to Christianity was not to
be deprived of her or his inheritance, such a person had to be permitted
to be a Hindu or Muslim, at least occasionally, for legal purposes.
Such paradoxical claims were creatively deployed during disputes at
the inter-personal level which took place within Indian families, and
often over property rights. In such disputes different members of the
same family claimed different religious, and hence legal status, and
this was the case not only when a member of the family had converted
to Christianity, but when the entire family was Christian, and had
been so for several generations. The notion of ‘conversion’, and the
official assumption that Indian Christians were inevitably ‘converts’
from a pre-existing religio-legal state provided particularly convenient
tools for certain kinds of patriarchal agendas. Certain Christian men
utilized legally comprehensible claims to a fictive past which was non-
Christian, premised on the legal provision of non-discrimination for
religious change, in order to deprive female members of the family of
legal entitlements which would otherwise have been theirs. If these
paradoxical collective and individual demands did not in themselves
create the Christian personal law, they did adopt it, and take it into
directions where we find it today.
For it is also essential to connect the history of Christian personal
law with the contemporary debates about these laws, whose gender
inequity surfaced into Indian political consciousness only in the
1990s.10 Although (thankfully) Christian personal law never entered
the political limelight like Muslim personal law, any examination of
10 In 1990, a Christian woman called Mary Sonia Zachariah could not get divorced
on the basis of physical cruelty, since the Indian Divorce Act 1869, which applied
to Christians, required adultery of the spouse in all cases, but coupled with an
aggravating cause, such as cruelty, for the wife. The Kerala High Court found this
unconstitutional gender discrimination, and recommended legislative action, failing
which, it declared the law unconstitutional in 1995. A similar judgement was received
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the debates preceding and following marriage reform legislation in
200111 shows that the parallel between religion versus women’s rights,
and personal laws versus uniform civil code has become generalized
in Indian thought. Fortunately for us, the unhappy life of Zabardast
Khan forces us to reconsider such patterns. For here we have a man
oppressed neither by ‘tradition’ nor by ‘modernity’ but apparently, by
falling in between both. Since he happened to be a male protagonist
caught in a non-existent marriage because of unfair marriage and
divorce laws, his case became iconic for men who attempted to
represent and lead a Christian political community in the early-
twentieth century. The earliest calls for reforming ‘Christian personal
law’ came not from women oppressed by tradition, but by men, who
found the reason for their victimization in their political weakness.
In broader terms, this paper investigates British religious policy in
India, which has been little explored, the official self-description of
‘neutrality’ being taken to mean an unproblematic disengagement
from religion,12 the purpose of such disengagement being attributed,
by some scholars, to an imperial legitimation project.13 I will show
that the insipid term ‘neutrality’ has concealed a complex baggage of
substantive law and policy relating to religion, which the postcolonial
Indian state inherited from its colonial predecessor. It is my argument
in the Bombay High Court in 1997. Flavia Agnes, Law and Gender Inequality: the Politics
of Women’s Rights in India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 154–156.
11 See Religion and Society, Special issue on the Uniform Civil Code, 43: 3
(September 1996), which brought together the opinions of the most committed
Christian advocates of reform, including Jyotsna Chatterji, as well as more
critical views. The Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act 2001 modified the Special
Marriage Act 1954, Hindu Marriage Act 1955, the Parsi Marriage and Divorce
Act 1936 and the Indian Divorce Act 1869, the last being relevant to
Christians. ‘Marriage law reforms’, Government of India, Press Information Bureau.
Visit http://pib.nic.in/feature/feyr2001/fnov2001/f221120011.html, last accessed 15
December 2009. Many Christian activists perceived the legislation to be skewed, and
imposed with undue haste by a BJP-led government. See John Dayal, AMatter of Equity:
Freedom of Faith in Secular India (New Delhi: Anamika, 2007), pp. 222–230.
12 The standard periodization posits a period of intense Evangelical Christian
(combinedwith secularUtilitarian) influence onBritish imperial policy in the first half
of the nineteenth century, followed by the ‘Mutiny’ of 1857, which was interpreted
widely as a religious reaction from Indians, and which apparently led to a settled
policy henceforth of non-interference in religion. Eric Stokes, The English Utilitarians
and India (Oxford: Clarendon, 1959); Thomas Metcalf, Aftermath of Revolt: India 1857–
70 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964).
13 Gauri Viswanathan, Masks of Conquest: Literary Studies and Colonial Rule in India
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1989); Gerald Studdert-Kennedy, Providence
and the Raj: ImperialMission andMissionary Imperialism (NewDelhi, London: Sage, 1998).
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that awareness of this history can permit us to step beyond the
somewhat reified discussions regarding the suitability and success of
secularism in India.14 One can only hope that it would also encourage
thought regarding legal conundrums in post-imperial Britain, where
efforts to secure racial justice and religious freedom appear to be
grappling unevenly with the categories of ‘religion’ and ‘race’.15
Personal laws and the uniform civil code: an old contradiction
India has four personal laws, Hindu, Muslim, Christian and Parsi,16
which apply to a person depending on his/her religious identity,
and travel with him/her wherever he/she goes within the country,
as opposed to laws that are of territorial application.17 The Hindu,
Muslim,Christian andParsi personal laws deal withmarriage, divorce,
inheritance, guardianship, and religious endowments of those legally
defined as Hindus, Muslims, Christians and Parsis. During judicial
consideration of any such dispute, determination of a person’s religious
identity is essential in order to establish the relevant law. Lack of
religious identity is simply not an option, even if the persons in question
do not practise or believe in any religion.18
14 Rajeev Bhargava (ed.), Secularism and its Critics (New Delhi: Oxford University
Press, 1998).
15 Geoffrey Bindman, ‘From Race to Religion: the Next Deterrent Law?’
http://www.opendemocracy.net/faith-europe_islam/article_2049.jsp, last accessed 15
December 2009. Bindman was legal adviser to the Commission for Racial Equality,
involved in a case in 1982–1983 about a Sikh boy Gurinder Singh Mandla, who was
refused permission to attend his private school if he wore his turban. Mandla’s case
for discrimination failed in the county court and the Court of Appeal, where it was
stated that only racial discrimination was actionable, not religious discrimination.
The House of Lords reversed these decisions in favour of Mandla, deciding that Sikhs
were a ‘race’ rather than purely a ‘religion’.
16 The last applying to Zoroastrians of Persian origin, known in India as ‘Parsis’.
17 G.C. Rankin, ‘The Personal Law in British India’ in Journal of the Royal Society of
Arts, Vol. 89 (May, 1941), pp. 426–442.
18 With the Hindus, the label includes those that are heterodox in their beliefs,
support non-Hindu religious groups or are socially and ritually ostracized fromaHindu
caste/sect/group. As Marc Galanter explains, the definition of ‘religious identity’ is
in reality a description of civil status, not of religious belief or social behaviour. Marc
Galanter, ‘Hinduism, Secularism and the Judiciary’, in Marc Galanter, Law and Society
in Modern India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 237–258, at p. 241.
Similarly, a person is assumed to be Muslim if his or her father is Muslim, unless he
or she explicitly renounces the faith. Asaf A.A. Fyzee, Outlines of Muhammadan Law (4th
edn, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 60–64.
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In that curious section of the Indian Constitution called the
‘Directive Principles’, which are non-judiciable, and represent the
aspirations of the India’s constitution-makers, is stated the aim of
establishing a uniform civil code. The rhetorical appropriation of the
uniform civil code project by right-wing Hindu majoritarian politics,
including that of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), has created an
apparently irresoluble contradiction for feminists,who are naturally
critical of the patriarchal nature of the personal laws, but are unwilling
to be used as pawns in the baiting of minorities, especially Muslims,
whose personal laws are projected by the BJP as an example of their
excessive privilege.19
While contemporary Indian feminists are troubled with the
apparent opposition between gender-justice and religious freedom,
it is very rarely noticed that the legal opposition between personal
laws and uniform civil laws has a long history, and is not the product
of the growing strength of women’s movements. The legal debate
over uniform laws and personal laws did not begin in the 1940s, as
Sangari states, but at least as early as the 1840s, and perhaps even
the 1730s, as this paper will demonstrate. Since the early eighteenth
century, British judges, statesmen, and later legislators contended
with the same dilemma in attempting to reconcile the principle of
a universal rule of law with what they saw as the requirements of
existing indigenous laws. The difference is that in the eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century debates, the foremost concern was not women’s
rights, but the nature of rights that could appertain to persons, who
did not comfortably fit the legally defined categories of Muslim or
Hindu, nor the relatively vague one of ‘British’. Since the earliest
Indian claims to the protection of a universal law, transcending
religious differences, weremade by IndianChristians, it is an historical
irony that this effort led to the creation of Christian personal law—
apparently another addition to the existing repertoire of fragmented
indigenous laws. And yet, the definition of the legal universal was
itself historically contingent (indeed for a long time it was unsure
whether the universal was Mughal law or British law), and the Indian
Christians’ demands for it were shaped by their particular social and
legal circumstances. At the centre of the process whereby Christians
in India acquired a ‘personal law’ stands the state. By describing that
process, this paper attempts to question the view that personal laws
19 See Kumkum Sangari, ‘Gender Lines: Personal Laws, Uniform Laws,
Conversion’, Social Scientist, Vol. 27, Nos 5/6 (May–June, 1999), pp. 17–61.
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are religious laws in any straightforward sense, preserved (if very
badly) against the incursions of legal universalism through a debatable
combination of indigenous activism and colonial solicitiousness.20 This
paper will instead highlight the active role of the colonial state in
refereeing competing legal claims to produce the personal laws, which
were ultimately state-sanctioned and state-dispensed laws, although
theoretically of religious origin, alongside a universal law transcending
religious difference.
Conversion, religious law, and natural law in
eighteenth-century Bombay
Christian personal law, as recognized today in India, consists of
statutes enacted in the second half of the nineteenth century.21 These
statutes did not simply recognize a religious tradition that had been
somehowoverlooked in the original accounting, butwere in every sense
a legal innovation. Such innovation did not however take place in a
vacuum—the statutes were the result of legal conundrums created by
disputes in which Christians of India were involved. This section offers
a glimpse of such disputes from the early eighteenth century and looks
at British legal attempts to resolve them. This will illustrate the ‘pre-
colonial’22 British patterns of legal thought and practice which, on the
acquisition of greater political power and judicial responsibility, led to
the creation of the four personal laws, and in particular, of Christian
personal law.
The sources of British judicial authority in early eighteenth-century
India were unclear and often conflicting; only in very limited locations
could such authority be traced to a recognizable sovereign, such as the
BritishCrownor theMughal emperor. TheMayors’Courts of the three
coastal settlements, established byRoyalCharter in1726, wereCrown
courts, deriving authority from the British sovereign, and as such,
20 For the argument that state-centred legal pluralism was distinctly modern, and
that it did not consist of ‘stacked’ laws with clearly distinguished spheres, see Lauren
Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures, pp. 1–30.
21 The Indian (Christian) Marriage Act 1872, Indian Divorce Act 1869 (amended
2001), Indian Succession Act 1865, and Guardians and Wards Act 1892.
22 In the sense that the British then possessed an unsubstantial political role.
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were meant to apply British law, or more accurately, English law.23 At
Madras andCalcutta, these tribunals were often in formal conflict with
Company officials acting as zamindars, a position that officially derived
authority from theMughal emperor.24 But the problemwas not simply
one of institutional multiplicity—even in Bombay, which was officially
Crown territory gifted to the Company, there were disputes among
the British regarding the legitimate method of dealing with religious
differences in law, in the context of India.
In June 1730, a widow called Zanocky (probably Janki) complained
to the EnglishMayor’s Court in Bombay city that her kinsman, ‘Bendu’
said to be of the taylor [sic] caste, had refused to return to her certain
valuables that she had given to him for safekeeping. Bendu, appearing
in court on 24 June, responded that, since he had taken care of
Zanocky’s son for six years, when Zanocky was taken as prisoner toGoa
by thePortuguese (andhadbecomeChristian), he should befinancially
compensated for his expenses. The court thought this reasonable, but
the case grew more complicated when Zanocky’s attorney complained
that Bendu was also guilty of withholding from her the custody of her
son, on grounds that she had becomeChristian. Zanocky’s son, a boy of
twelve called Lachmana (Lakshmana) was summoned to court where
he stated that he did not wish to become Christian nor live with his
mother, but the Mayor, Edward Page, ordered the boy to be returned
to Zanocky, while warning her not to force him in matters of religion.
Zanocky pledged that she would not, promising to house her son in a
‘Gentue’(Gentoo, i.e. Hindu) house.25
23 C. J. B. Larby, ‘The Centenary of the High Courts of Calcutta, Bombay and
Madras’ in The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 3 (July, 1963),
pp. 1044–1048.
24 The sale deed executed between the Mughal provincial government and the
Company during the transfer of the zamindari of Calcutta in 1694 did not explicitly
mention judicial powers, except perhaps with reference to the Company being
accorded talluqdar status. Farhat Hasan, ‘Indigenous Cooperation and the Birth of
a Colonial City: Calcutta, c. 1698–1750’ in Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1,
(February 1992), pp. 65–82, at p. 69. This revealed a certain Mughal approach to
legal authority: the police and judicial powers which all Mughal zamindars exercised,
were implicitly acknowledged rather than formally delegated to these ‘little kings’. On
zamindars under Mughal rule, and their legal powers, see Radhika Singha, A Despotism
of Law: Crime and Justice in Early Colonial India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,
1998), pp. 1–6. At the same time, such informal legal delegation proved to be a potent
source of jurisdictional conflict.
25 Register of Proceedings of theMayor’sCourt, Bombay January–September1830,
p. 120, P/416/103, Asia, Pacific and Africa Collections, British Library, London
(henceforth, APAC).
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Bendu was not satisfied, and neither were other members of the
caste, who further alerted the Mayor when Zanocky failed to keep her
promise and took her son to her own house. At the next session of the
Mayor’s Court, on 29 June, the Mayor read a letter from the Governor
of Bombay, RobertCowan, rebuking the court for usurping jurisdiction
that did not belong to them, by interfering in what was a matter
of caste customs.26 The Mayor wrote back that the case was a civil
one, and hence certainly within their jurisdiction, as opposed to a
criminal or an ecclesiastical cause. In their view, their decision derived
indisputably from the natural right of a parent over a child, according
to the natural law theorists Hugo Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf.27
This right consisted of authority over a child until the child attained
the age of judgement. In addition, the involvement of disputes over
property made it a civil case, and the Mayor’s Court was not deterred
from taking cognizance of it by caste issues being involved.28
The Governor responded with great irritation that the Mayor had
got both the classification of the case, and the relevant law wrong.
Since the Mayor’s Court had confessed to not possessing ecclesiastical
jurisdiction, they should have refrained from interfering in a religious
dispute, since caste was at the core of Hindu religion. As far as the law
was concerned, Grotius or Pufendorf would accept that the natural
right of the parent could be superseded under certain circumstances,
Pufendorf in particular having mentioned the very different customs
among the Romans and the Thebans. Had the revered Pufendorf
known as much about the Hindus, he would certainly have mentioned
them as another (valid) variation. What Pufendorf had failed to do,
Cowan proceeded to rectify, informing the court that with Hindus,
parental rights ended absolutely when the parent changed his or her
religion.Whether or not such customwas laudable, it was the law, since
the Company directors had instructed full respect to native customs,
i.e. recognized them as law. Hence in returning the Hindu boy to
his Christian mother, the Mayor had violated the law.29 Page took
the matter to the Court of Directors in England, lodging a formal
26 Bombay Public Proceedings, 26 June 1730, P/341/7, pp. 75–80, APAC.
27 For a discussion of natural law theory, especially as developed by Pufendorf’s
disciples in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries in Europe, see T. J.
Hochstrasser, Natural Law Theories in the Early Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000).
28 Register of Proceedings of theMayor’s Court, Bombay 1 July 1830, pp. 140–144.
29 Bombay Public Proceedings, 10 July 1730, pp. 89–95.
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complaint against Cowan, which was investigated by the Committee
of Correspondence.30
The Bombay Mayor’s Court continued to give trouble in the
following years, by insisting that Hindu interpreters and witnesses
swear with their hands on a cow rather than on the Bhagavad Gita, and
holding up proceedings when they refused to do so.31 Such creative
efforts to accommodate ‘native custom’ within common law were
discouraged by a Dispatch in 1731 from the Court of Directors,
which instructed the Mayor’s Courts to restrict themselves to English
law, leaving the ‘natives’ to decide their own disputes, unless they
voluntarily chose to come to the English court, in which case English
law was to apply.32 Further discontent in Madras over forms of oath-
taking led to explicit exemption of ‘natives’ from the jurisdiction of the
Mayor’s Courts (except where they chose to submit to it) when their
Charter was renewed in 1753.33 In spite of this, Indians continued
to provide the bulk of these courts’ business, perhaps for lack of an
equally effective alternative.34
Separating laws, sorting people: Mayor and zamindar in
eighteenth-century Calcutta
At Calcutta, the claim of the British zamindari to be an alternative
‘native’ tribunal did not prevent jurisdictional conflict, and only
30 Court Book, April 1730 to March 1732, B/61, pp. 483, 509–510, APAC.
31 Their efforts make sense in the context of David Lieberman’s discussion of the
efforts of late-eighteenth-century British jurists to override the rules of evidence in
English common law, whereby an infidel who could not swear a Christian oath, had
no locus standi in court. Lieberman discusses how natural law was used to argue for an
universal rule of evidence beyond (religious) prescriptions that obviously deterred the
course of justice; the Mayors’ Courts efforts in India seemed not so much to override
religious law, as to expand it beyond Christianity, a radical innovation which has
received little attention from historians. David Lieberman, The Province of Legislation
Determined: Legal Theory inEighteenth-Century Britain (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity
Press, 1989), pp. 88–98.
32 Charles Fawcett, The First Century of British Justice in India (Oxford: Clarendon,
1934), pp. 222–224.
33 Courtenay Ilbert, ‘Application of European Law to the Natives of India’ in Journal
of the Society of Comparative Legislation, Vol. 1 (1896–1897), pp. 212–226, at p. 213.
34 Derrett suggested that the attraction of British courts derived from their being
less arbitrative, and hence able to provide a more conclusive victory than a traditional
forum which attempted to restore social harmony rather than rigidly separate right
from wrong. J. D. M. Derrett, ‘The Administration of Hindu Law by the British’,
Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1961), pp. 10–52.
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showed that such conflicts did not derive merely from institutional
flaws or improper legal comprehension, but from the very
impreciseness of classificatory categories, in particular, race. Race,
in the sense of observable and biologically inherent differences
between people, was repeatedly deployed in eighteenth-century
judicial disputes, during efforts to separate British law from Indian
law, and an amorphous category of people called ‘British subjects’
from Indians. It proved to be an inadequate measure in both cases.
In 1755, J. Z. Holwell, as zamindar of Calcutta, heard a case,
consisting of a plaint by a woman called Phoebe and her husband,
Mons. Demontaguy [sic], against Sarah, Phoebe’s mother, seeking the
restitution of certain jewellery and other valuables deposited with
the older woman before Phoebe’s marriage. Sarah stated that the
property in question had been deposited with her for the maintenance
of her grandchild, Phoebe’s daughter by her first marriage. Since she
had no documents to prove this assertion, Holwell decreed that the
property should be delivered to his court, and transferred the same
to Phoebe and her husband. Very soon afterwards, Holwell received a
summons from the Mayor’s Court, which, on Sarah’s plaint, accused
him of overstepping the powers of his office (by taking note of a case
involving British subjects) and ordered him to return the valuables in
question. Holwell complained to the Governor’s council (of which he
was a part) that Sarah was no more than a ‘black Fringy’35 and that
his appearance in court as defendant for an action performed in his
capacity as zamindar would undermine the dignity of his office.36 In a
longer petition addressed to Governor Drake he argued that even if
he had infringed on the jurisdiction of the Mayor’s Court, the appeal
should lie with the Council and not the Mayor, who was judge of
another court of equivalent status. But, he argued, he had not in fact
overstepped his authority by hearing a dispute involving an European
Christian (Phoebe’s husband) and two ‘Mustee’ Christians,37 since
the zamindar’s court had on earlier occasions heard complaints of
Europeans against natives, whether ‘Bengallers’ (Bengalis) or ‘Mustee
Fringys’ and ‘Fringy against Fringy’.38 TheCouncil sided withHolwell,
35 Indian corruption of ‘Frank’, i.e. European, but used by Holwell in the sense of a
mixed-race person of partial European ancestry.
36 W. K. Firminger, ‘Some Records Illustrative of the Mayor’s Court–II’, Bengal:
Past & Present, Vol. 10 (January–June 1915), pp. 123–145, at pp. 124–125.
37 A term that the compiler (Firminger) glossed as a corruption ofmestic¸o, or ‘mixed’
in Portuguese.
38 Ibid., pp. 128–31.
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and wrote to the Mayor’s Court requesting withdrawal of the citation,
asserting that any complaint against the zamindar had to be made
before the Council.
The Council was in reality divided—the only two members
with previous experience as zamindar stating that a case involving
‘Portuguese’ was cognizable by the zamindar, but perhaps not one in
which a ‘European’ was the plaintiff.39 The Mayor’s Court itself wrote
back claiming full jurisdiction over cases of ‘Meum and Tuum’ where
His Majesty’s subjects were concerned. They also declared themselves
unable to locate the source of the zamindar’s judicial authority, since
it was not mentioned in the Charter of 1753. In their opinion,
Holwell was duty-bound to produce the valuables he had illegitimately
dispensed with.40 Holwell was deeply indignant; he pleaded inability to
go about his business as zamindar if subjected to such restrictions, and
produced a table of plausible racial combinations, asking the Council
whether he could in future deal with cases involving:
1st Complaints fil’d by British subjects or Europeans against Hindoos &
Mussellmen in matters of Meum & Teum
2dly. Fil’d by British subjects or Europeans against Fringys
3dly. ” by Fringy against Fringy
4thly. ” by British subjects or Europeans against Armenians
5thly. ” by Armenian against Armenian
6thly. ” by Armenian against Hindu and Mussellmen
7thly. ” by Armenian against Fringy
8thly. ” by Fringy against Armenian
9thly. ” by Hindoos & Mussellmen against Armenian and Fringys
10thly. ” by Fringys against Mussellmen and Hindoo’s.41
Having produced this table of combinations, Holwell also provided a
number of detailed glosses, explaining what the word ‘Fringy’ meant,
and a legal argument:
. . . blackMustee PortuguezeChristians residing in the Settlement as a people
distinct from the natural & proper subjects of Portugall & as a people who
sprung originally fromHindoo’s andMussellmen&who by the Law ofNations
canott [sic] be exempted from allegiance to the Mogull their naturall Lord
39 Ibid., pp. 131–33.
40 Letter from the Mayor’s Court to President and Governor in Council, Fort
William, in ibid., pp. 133–135.
41 Holwell to Council, 16 June 1755, ibid., pp. 135–143.
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any more than a British subject is freed from his Allegiance to the King of
England by embracing the Mahomedan faith . . . .42
In his opinion, therefore, ‘Fringys’ should be considered natives,
since their biological features (‘black’) and political status (i.e. not
‘proper subjects of Portugal’) connected them inextricably with the
Hindus and Muslims they had ‘sprung’ from. Since the Hindus and
Muslims, as ‘natives’ of India were exclusively subject to Mughal law
(represented, in this case by Holwell himself), the Mayor, dispensing
British law, could have no jurisdiction over those identified as ‘natives’,
as Sarah and Phoebe were. It appeared that only their religion
(Christianity) required argument: and for this purpose Holwell
generated the analogy between Mughal and British sovereignty,
neither of which could be overridden by changing one’s religion. Of
course, nobody had changed their religion in this case, but for Holwell
it was essential to use the concept of conversion to explain away the
unwieldy qualities of the litigants, and put them firmly in their place
as ‘natives’.
Holwell also asserted that unless his jurisdiction was affirmed, the
functions of the zamindar could not be performed,43 an assertion that
pointed to the centrality of classification to the working of Anglo-
Indian law. The explosion of uncertainty in classificatory categories did
not however lead to the loss of confidence that such categories could
be devised. In this case, the Council gave out the amazingly simplistic
decision that the zamindar should avoid cases involving ‘Fringies’ aswell
as Europeans, unless requested to act as arbitrator. If this was an effort
to mop up the disruptive few by using a binary racial scheme (native
versus Fringy-European), such classification undermined itself by the
associated instruction referring to religious qualifications: a quorum
of three judges had to be present to hear criminal cases involving
Christians.44
Very soon afterwards, the judicial landscape of Bengal was destined
to change. The young Nawab of Bengal invaded Calcutta the next
year, leading to the Battle of Plassey in 1757 and to the de facto
acquisition of political power in Bengal by the East India Company.45
Before considering the changes wrought by this ‘revolution’, the cases
42 Ibid., p. 136.
43 Ibid., p. 142.
44 Charles Fawcett, The First Century, pp. 208–209.
45 For a discussion of these events, see P. J. Marshall, Bengal: the British Bridgehead
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 70–92.
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discussed above can be used to examine some of the early problems
faced by the British in their effort to accommodate the problem
of difference in law. A crucial imperative, one that lay behind the
abstruse discussions regarding natural law or the varieties of creole
populations in India, was the need to distinguish the realm of British
law from inherently different forms of law, and as a corollary to that,
the British from those who were considered appropriate subjects of
different laws. While it appeared that the effort at this stage was
to contain difference by separating tribunals and jurisdictions, this
approach was inherently unstable.
The elusive goal of a universal law was already being recommended,
and perhaps it was prescient of the future that even before the
acquisition of political power, the Mayor’s Court of Calcutta failed
to recognize alternative sovereign sources of judicial power within
a single territory. But one should be wary of perceiving a linear
progression of legal and judicial centralisation from this point, for
in spite of the self-aggrandizing ambitions of a few amateur judges,
it was not a simple proposition to arrive at a ‘universal law’ which
transcended the exotic differences of India. Among other things,
the Mayors had to contend with British opponents, committed to
the recognition of distinct legal jurisdictions in India, and capable
of deploying the ‘universalising’ language of natural law to completely
different ends. In Zanocky’s case, when the Mayor of Bombay used
natural law to assert the apparently ‘universal’ claims of parents which
should be protected by the state, regardless of religious difference,
the Governor’s response was to point out that this ‘universal’ right
in natural law did not preclude its limitation by customs which may
appear exotic to the jurist, but whichmerely helped the natural lawyer
realize the particularity of the laws with which he was familiar. If such
customs were recognized by the sovereign, they were the law—an
approach that derived from a British common law tradition, which in
any case, was informed by natural law theories.46
In Phoebe and Sarah’s case, the dispute was not about the content of
law, but about classifying people to whom different laws and tribunals
should apply. In this taxonomic effort, religionmingledwith references
to embodied characteristics, and tautologically, to political status.
Claiming British subject status as a Christian proved problematic for
46 An old scholarly piece on the role of natural law in shaping common law is
RichardO’Sullivan, ‘Natural LawandCommonLaw’ inTransactions of theGrotiusSociety,
Vol. 31 (1945), pp. 117–138.
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Sarah with her dark skin and complicated personal and family history.
The term ‘British subject’ was primarily intended as a distinction from
‘native’ but the distinction was blurred with the presence of Europeans
and descendants of Europeans who were (unequal) subjects of other
European kingdoms (such as Portugal), or even of theMughal empire.
In the periods that followed, growing assumption of political and
legislative power by the East India Company, and later by the British
Parliament, helped expand these conundrums into the persistent legal
puzzles about difference and universality. In the early-eighteenth
century, Christians had the distinction of provoking conflicts that
revealed the inadequacy of intellectual and legal axioms underlying
the system of personal laws.
Discussing the arbitrary nature of British legal classifications should
not, however, obscure an outstanding feature of these cases, which
is the active role of Indians, particularly women, in perceiving and
exploiting the potential derived from multiple legal statuses and
multiple jurisdictions. In discussions of later disputes, scholars have
pointed to the utilization of a stereotype of the vulnerable Oriental
woman by the British judges keen on overriding multiple legal
jurisdictions to offer succour to such potential victims.47 Perhaps
Indian women were aware of the potential of such a ‘sympathetic’
audience. Certainly they were active protagonists in choosing legal
status, and hence jurisdiction, which would serve their interests.
Zanocky perceived that the Mayor’s Court was more likely to support
her than a caste council, as did Sarah. On the other hand, a pursuit
of feminine interests did not necessarily coincide with an attraction
for universalizing interpretations of European law, since Phoebe, with
her light skin and European husband, felt that the zamindar’s court and
the status of a native would serve her best.
One can also already see the role of collective petitioning, and
cannot but be impressed with the speed with which Indians organized
and represented themselves in terms intelligible to the British. The
‘tailor’ caste in Bombay had obviously impressed the Governor that
theirs was a custom that was part of a distinct realm of law whose
overarching framework was Hindu, and hence distinct from British
law, and they did this within days of Bendu receiving an unfavourable
judgement in the Mayor’s Court. Such claims, filtered through British
legal ideas derived from natural law as well as common law, paved
47 See Robert Travers, Ideology and Empire, pp. 191–200.
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the way for a system of centralised state-dependent legal pluralism, in
which universality remained an elusive but constant quest.
Post–1765: the grant of diwani and the creation of personal laws
Most scholars consider that the system of personal laws, as we know
it today, was inaugurated in 1772.48 Important developments had
certainly taken place in the years preceding this supposed originary
moment. In 1757, the Nawab of Bengal had been defeated in battle
by the East India Company, leading to a couple of puppet regimes.
This was followed by a further confrontation in 1765, in which
the Mughal emperor himself was involved, and was ‘convinced’, on
defeat, to delegate to the Company the responsibility for the diwani
of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa (revenue department and civil justice).49
After a period of working through the existing Indian administrative
structure, the unsatisfactory revenue yields produced by the de facto
administrator, Muhammad Reza Khan,50 coupled with severe famine
and social dislocation, led to the Directors of the Company appointing
Warren Hastings as Governor of Bengal in 1772, with orders to
arrange for the Company to ‘stand forth’ as diwan.51
This meant new and comprehensive arrangements for the collection
of revenue and administration of justice, and Hastings, who claimed
to be restoring the ‘ancient Mogul constitution’ following decades
of dislocation, proposed a hierarchical system of courts divided into
civil and criminal, or diwani and nizamat, appeals going from the
district up to the highest tribunal at the Sadr Diwani Adalat, located
at Calcutta, and the Sadr Nizamat Adalat, located at Murshidabad
(later Calcutta).52 While these courts were to be in theory Mughal
48 See Derrett’s comments on the ‘peculiar’ provisions of Hastings’ plan, the
limited set of topics on which shastra was supposed to provide sources of law, and
his speculations on why this particular set of topics was chosen over others. J. D. M.
Derrett, Religion, Law and the State in India, pp. 233–234.
49 Peter J. Marshall, Bengal: the British Bridgehead, p. 93.
50 On Reza Khan’s career, see Abdul Majed Khan, The Transition in Bengal 1756–
1775: a Study ofMuhammadRezaKhan (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press,1969).
51 Penderel Moon, Warren Hastings and British India (London: Hodder & Stoughton,
1947), pp. 70–85.
52 Nizamat (involving military rule as well as criminal jurisdiction) was in theory
not the province of the Company as diwan, but of the Nawab, whose capital remained
at Murshidabad. Very soon however, the Company did take over complete political
power, as well as control over the nizamat adalats, such that Muslim law officers were
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courts, the sources of law were far from clear. As far as civil law
was concerned, Hastings suggested in the diwani courts ‘all cases of
inheritance, marriage or other matters for whichMahomedan law has
made a provision should be decided by the establishedmagistrate with
the assistance of the expounders of law’, and similarly ‘that all matters
respecting inheritance and the particular laws and usages of the casts
of Gentoos should be decided by the establishedmagistrate assisted by
Bramins and the other heads of Casts according toGentoo law’.53 Reza
Khan, trained inMughal administration, found the idea preposterous:
‘to order a magistrate of the faith to decide in conjunction with a
Bramin [sic] would be repugnant to the rules of the faith . . .’, he
complained.54 The day of Reza Khan was coming to an end: arrested
for malgovernance in April 1772, his efforts to train the British in the
art of Mughal government were doomed.55
In British opinion, their policy was both a continuation of Mughal
practice, and a measure of their liberal attitudes, which on several
future occasions they could contrast with that of Reza Khan, who
developed a posthumous reputation as the archetypicalMuslim tyrant.
As Robert Travers has pointed out, underlying British assertions of
liberalism was a different notion of sovereignty and justice: while the
Mughal approach was to countenance the diffusion of adjudication at
various social levels; the British one was essentially state-centred.56 In
other words, Mughal statesmen were willing to make the use of state
relegated to advisory capacity in 1791. See M. P. Jain, Outlines of Indian Legal History,
pp. 58–66, 118–144. For change in the substance of criminal law, see Radhika Singha,
A Despotism of Law, pp. 1–32.
53 FortWilliamLetter of 13April1772, quoted inAbdulMajedKhan,TheTransition
in Bengal, pp. 270–271.
54 Reza Khan’s statement, 4 May 1772, quoted in ibid., p. 271. Unfortunately,
information is inadequate regarding the experience of non-Muslims in the pre-colonial
Mughal courts. If Mughal practice was at all similar to that of the Ottomans, Mughal
qazis would have applied Islamic law to all who chose to submit their matrimonial
and inheritance disputes to their courts, otherwise they did not interfere in the intra-
community resolution of disputes. Najwa al-Qattan, ‘Dhimm¯ıs in the Muslim Court:
Legal Autonomy and Religious Discrimination’ in International Journal of Middle East
Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3 (August, 1999), pp. 429–444.
55 Chris Bayly has argued that the Mughal administrative elite attempted, in the
early days of British colonial rule in India, not only to transfer their skills to the new
rulers, but also ‘to instruct the British in good government’, referring in particular
to Muhammad Reza Khan, and his prote´ge´, Ali Ibrahim Khan, who later became
the chief judge of Benares. C.A. Bayly, Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and
Social Communication in India, 1780–1870 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1999), pp. 80–83.
56 Robert Travers, Ideology and Empire, pp. 118–123.
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courts voluntary for a wide range of social disputes, in particular for
family and inheritance disputes of non-Muslims, but once approached
the qazi applied a unified law which was, at least in theory, derived
from Islam.
In a sense, the approach of the Mayors as well as the Councils
in early eighteenth-century British settlements, was similar to that
of the Mughal qazis, in that all three conceived of a jurisdictionally
limited role for themselves. There were however two distinctions that
would lead to a different post-Mughal legal history for India. Firstly,
the effort in both British forums to incorporate ‘local custom’ within
a unified legal system and dispense it through a common judicial
mechanism, something Reza Khan declared improper for a Muslim
judge to do officially. Secondly, and more crucially, as modern nation-
states of Europe, including Britain, took shape, they claimed the
constitution of the family as their exclusive remit, and from the late-
eighteenth century onwards, this led to state-centric, homogenous
and exponentially more penetrative regimes of marriage, divorce,
child custody, and inheritance laws. As a result, difference, when
acknowledged in imperial law, was equally penetrative. The emerging
colonial state claimed the right to adjudicate all domestic and property
disputes, if according to separate sets of laws, which were valid only
if recognized by itself, and which were to be applied according to the
legal status of the party, again, determined according to the state’s
‘objective’ criteria. This was indeed a moment of intellectual as well
as institutional transformation in Indian law, from which arose the
quintessentially modern phenomenon of personal laws.57
Universal law and religious law: Supreme Courts, natural law
and ecclesiastical jurisdiction
The quest for universal law remained and expanded at the same time
as the development of personal laws, especially with the institution
57 The above is an argument regarding the nature of the personal laws which
is distinct from, but based on the numerous studies that have shown how colonial
codification projects aimed at providing substantive Hindu and Muslim laws in
effect displaced traditional Indian legal practice and its traditional specialists. For
prominent examples of such works of scholarship, see J. D. M. Derrett, Religion, Law
and the State in India, pp. 225–320; Michael R. Anderson, ‘Islamic Law and the Colonial
Encounter’ in Peter Robb and David Arnold (eds), Institutions and Ideologies: a SOAS
South Asia Reader (Richmond: Curzon, 1993), pp. 165–185.
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of the Supreme Court at Calcutta in 1774, by order of the British
Parliament, as successor to, and superseding, the Mayors’ Courts.
The Supreme Court’s jurisdiction was ab initio limited: ‘racially’
its authority extended over all British subjects in the province,
territorially over all persons within the city of Calcutta, and more
expansively, over all persons employed by the Company or its servants.
In more than one way therefore, a territorial division of the capital
from the country, the former run by British law and the latter by
Company-as-Mughal law, was subject to tensions due to overlap.
Scholars, including Robert Travers, have also discussed how the
SupremeCourt judges used transcendent claims, premised once again
on ‘natural law’, to exercise judicial review over the functioning of the
Company’s Courts.58 But it would be widely inaccurate to imagine
that the Company’s Courts were pure ‘Mughal courts’ (any more
than Holwell’s zamindari had been); other than completely un-Mughal
notions of religious civil law, these courts were manned by British
officials, and regulated by rules framed by the British government at
Calcutta, whose state imperatives led to a complete transformation in
criminal law.59
The Supreme Court’s references to natural law, which was in the
end a philosophical principle, has received attention from scholars
who see within such arguments the British tendency to push back
the claims of indigenous laws and indigenous legal specialists. There
was anothermore substantive aspect of the SupremeCourts which has
received little attention, which is that other than civil, criminal, equity,
and admiralty, it possessed a jurisdiction known as ‘ecclesiastical’.
Although derived from ‘ecclesia’ or the Church, the ecclesiastical
law of Britain was, especially since the Restoration, canon law as
recognized by the state, and dispensed by state courts, even if these
courts were manned by clerics. Until 1857 ecclesiastical jurisdiction,
58 Robert Travers, Ideology and Empire, pp. 181–206. The case discussed was one of
a Muslim widow who claimed entire possession of her husband’s estate on the basis
of a will, as opposed to the claims of the husband’s nephew as the principal male
successor. Defeated in the provincial diwani adalat when the qazi and mufti, theMuslim
law officers, decreed against her and even evicted her, she proceeded to Calcutta
to file her case in the Supreme Court in 1778, which found in her favour in 1779
and indicted the provincial administration for illegitimately delegating their judicial
duties to the Muslim law officers, and for victimizing a helpless Asiatic woman.
59 One of these imperatives was more summary methods for dealing with ‘law and
order’ problems, such as ‘Thagi’, which led to framing homicide as murder rather
than as a negotiable civil cause, as in Islamic law. See Radhika Singha, A Despotism of
Law, pp. 1–32.
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under English law, included all matrimonial and custody disputes, and
a substantial section of inheritance causes, particularly those involving
wills on large estates.60 In the colonies, because of the absence of
an adequate Anglican establishment, the higher crown courts often
possessed an ecclesiastical side.61 The colonial distinction was the
limitation of jurisdiction: the Calcutta Supreme Court’s ecclesiastical
jurisdiction was expressly limited to all British subjects (as opposed
to ‘natives’) in the province, and the relevant law was to be the
ecclesiastical law used in the diocese of London.62 The Company
courts being, in theory, Mughal courts, did not possess ecclesiastical
jurisdiction, and in any case had no jurisdiction over Europeans. Hence
when they dealt with matrimonial and inheritance disputes, they
expected to apply either Muslim or Hindu law, depending on the
status of the parties. Problems arose when certain parties failed to
meet these identifying criteria precisely enough, producing not even
a conflict of jurisdiction, but a seeming lack of it.
In 1839, two Parsi63 young men, Dhanjibhai and Hormasji, conver-
ted to Christianity under the guidance of the Scottish missionary John
Wilson. Both took refuge in the missionary’s house and while legal
claims for Dhanjibhai’s custody by his guardians failed,64 his married
friend Hormasji entered a protracted legal battle with his natal family
and that of his Parsi wife, who all treated his conversion as the end
of his claims on his family. A month after his baptism, Hormasji’s
daughter was affianced without his consent. Although Hormasji did
not resist this directly, he kept up his efforts to recover his wife and
60 In fact, theEnglish law ofmarriagewas canon law, asmodified by certain statutes,
such as Lord Hardwicke’s Act of 1753. R. H. Helmholz, Marriage Litigation in Medieval
England (London, 1974), p. 3; J. H. Baker, An introduction to English legal history (3rd
edn, London, 1990), pp. 567–568; Lawrence Stone,Road to divorce: England 1530–1987
(Oxford, 1990), pp. 353–390. On the changing jurisdiction over inheritance causes,
Lloyd Bonfield, ‘Testamentary Causes in the Prerogative Court of Canterbury, 1660–
96’ in Christopher Brooks and Michel Lobban (eds), Communities and Courts in Britain,
1150–1900 (London: Hambledon Press, 1997), pp. 133–154.
61 This was true of India, as well as in the Straits Settlements.
62 ‘Letters Patent establishing the Supreme Court at Fort William, 1774’, in
Anil Chandra Banerjee, Indian Constitutional Documents 1757–1947 (4th edn, 4 vols.,
Calcutta: A.Mukherjee &Co., 1974), pp. 36–43. Similar courts were set up inMadras
in 1800 and Bombay in 1823.
63 Zoroastrians whomigrated from Iran to India in the seventh century, and settled
in rural Gujarat, later moving into Bombay as commercial entrepreneurs.
64 On the grounds that, at sixteen, when most Parsis were married, he should
be considered an adult. ‘Conversion of two Parsis, and prosecution of the Rev. John
Wilson, D.D., on a writ of habeas corpus, before the Supreme Court of Judicature at
Bombay. Crown side’, Oriental Christian Spectator (June, 1939), pp. 209–291.
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daughter, and only in 1843, after his wife had married another Parsi
man, he applied to the Bombay Supreme Court to regain custody of
his daughter. The Court’s discussion preceding the judgement was
remarkably similar to the one occasioned by the Zanocky case in June
1730 mentioned above. It turned on the question of whether the
natural law right of the father to custody of his children65 could be
shown to have been superseded in this case by the existence of a Parsi
law directing loss of custody on religious conversion. Since no such
law could be found, Hormasji received custody of his daughter,66 but
recovering his wife appeared out of the question.
In the same year, a deserted Parsi wife attempted to recover her
husband, or at least, his obligations towards her, by instituting a case
for the restitution of conjugal rights on the ecclesiastical side of the
Supreme Court of Bombay. The husband, who was acting in defiance
of the Parsi panchayat or body of elders,67 argued that since he was
a Zoroastrian, the court had no jurisdiction over him in the matter.
Although Justice Erskine Perry ruled that it did, the husband remained
recalcitrant, and in 1856, a further attempt by the wife was dismissed
by the Privy Council on the grounds that ecclesiastical jurisdiction did
not apply to the Zoroastrian marriage.68
The cases involving the Parsis, a community undergoing rapid
religious and social change in the nineteenth century, including
conversions to Christianity, reveals important trends of development
in the colonial Indian legal system, and how a community that was
itself ‘exceptional’ negotiated and experienced this system. By being
neitherHindu norMuslim, the Parsi collective claim to a discrete body
65 Veena Das has used the judgement in this case to underline the political
construction of paternity, which was presented as a natural state. Zanocky’s case
warrants reconsidering the conflation of parental right with paternity in British legal
thought. Veena Das, ‘Secularism and the Argument from Nature’, in David Scott and
Charles Hirschkind (eds), Powers of the Secular Modern: Talal Asad and His Interlocutors
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), pp. 93–112.
66 The Queen v. Shapurji Bezonji and Bezanji Edalji, 28 February 1843, Indian
Decisions (Old Series) (Madras: T.A. Venkasawmy Row, 1912), Vol. 4, pp. 84–94.
67 On the creation of the Parsi panchayat as a ‘traditional’ judicial body under
British patronage, see Susan Stiles Maneck, The Death of Ahriman: Culture, Identity and
Theological Change among the Parsis of India (Bombay: K.R. Cama Oriental Institute,
1997), pp. 160–181. The panchayat was opposed to bigamy, but a nouveau-riche faction
within the community, represented by young men such as Ardasir, were defiant of
this rule because they wished to establish a more companionate second marriage for
themselves, being dissatisfied with their uneducated first wives, usually married in
childhood. On the Ardasir case, Ibid., pp. 173–175.
68 Ardaseer Cursetjee v. Perozeboye, (1856) Moore’s Indian Appeals, 348–392.
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of law was weak, hence a young man (Dhanjibhai) deemed adult was
not deprived of his physical and religious freedom for disobeying his
guardians and changing his religion. Also, a Parsi father (Hormasji)
was able to recover custody of his child in spite of changing his
religion, in the absence of a recognized law to the contrary. In the case
of marital obligations however, it appeared that difference overrode
any possible universality. Each of these episodes alerted Parsis to
the strength of the British legal system, and the need to discover a
coherent body of personal laws, to prevent being subjected to English
ecclesiastical laws, or the projected ‘uniform civil code’, which, in the
absence of special ‘exemptions’ (as already in place for Hindus and
Muslims) appeared to be on the verge of imposing a British law that
claimed to be indifferent to religion on all residual categories. The
Parsis organized themselves with tremendous alacrity, representing
effectively to the British government the rules that the Zoroastrian
religion prescribed for marriage, divorce, custody and inheritance,69
which unsurprisingly included grounds for divorce and disinheritance
on the premise of religious out-conversion.70
Law Commissions and the debate over the ‘lex loci’
The Parsi project narrowly apprehended, and dovetailed itself into a
massive imperial scheme for rationalizing and codifying the laws of
69 For a comprehensive documentation of this project, see Sorabjee Shapoorjee
Bengalee, The Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act 1865 (Bombay: Duftur Ashkara Press,
1868). I am grateful to Mitra Sharafi for this reference, and for alerting me to the
dynamic legal history of Parsis in India.
70 The draft prepared by the Parsi Law Association, consisting of modern, legally
active Parsi leaders, demanded dissolution of marriage following out-conversion, but
this was vetoed by the Select Committee of the Governor-General’s Council, presided
over by Henry Maine. See papers connected with an Act to define and amend the
law relating to marriage and divorce among the Parsees, XV of 1865, Government
of India, Bills and Acts, L/PJ/5/7, APAC. In the amended Parsi Marriage and Divorce
Act, III of 1936, religious change was re-inserted as a ground for seeking divorce,
although not for automatic dissolution, since Parsi activists were also concerned with
preventing the avoidance of marital duties (including monogamy) by conversion to
Hinduism or Islam. Pestanji Phirozshah Balsara (ed.), The Parsi Marriage and Divorce
Act, (Bombay: Jehangir B. Karani’s Sons, 1936). As for inheritance, Parsi activists
appear to have concentrated their energies on barring access to Parsi charitable trust
funds (rather than on private estates) for those who did not in their opinion qualify
as Parsi. For a path-breaking study of Parsi self-definition in and through the Anglo-
Indian legal system, and the rise of race in the early twentieth-century, see Mitra
June Sharafi, ‘Bella’s case: Parsi identity and the law in colonial Rangoon, Bombay
and London, 1887–1925’ (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Princeton, 2006).
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India. On the occasion of the Company’s charter being renewed in
1833, the British Parliament examined the state of government in
India, and the legal situation was found particularly unsatisfactory. A
number of British judges who had worked in India complained of the
conflicting jurisdictions and conflicts of law endemic in the system.
With the Charter Act of 1833, the British Parliament decided to add
a specialized lawmember to the Governor- General of India’s Council,
this office being occupied by Thomas Babington, Lord Macaulay. In
1835, Macaulay was also appointed chair of the First Indian Law
Commission, which was to investigate the situation of Indian laws,
and propose improvements.71
Among the relatively minor issues with which the first Commission
dealt were the petitions of the East Indians72 and Armenians
complaining that there was no adequate law securing the validity
of their marriages and inheritance practices. In 1842, the first Law
Commission rejected an existing government proposal for a specific
law regulating the marriages of East Indians, on grounds that this
racial category was too indefinite, a declaration that would have won
the approval ofHolwell, if not the recommendation that flowed from it.
In the Commissioners’ opinion, the East Indians would best be served
by one uniform law for all those who were not Hindus or Muslims,
which should be the lex loci, or ‘law of the country’. This then led
to discussion of what the lex loci was or ought to be, a discussion
also relevant in determining the validity of legislative interventions in
matters of pan-imperial significance, such as the abolition of Indian
forms of slavery.73 On this occasion, the law commissioners considered,
perhaps for the last time, the possibility that Muslim law was the
lex loci of India. This reprehensible possibility was however rejected by
resurrecting the long-buried Reza Khan, using his condemnation of
the personal law system as evidence of the inability of Muslim law to
restrict itself, and hence being sufficiently tolerant to difference, as
only English law could.74
71 M. P. Jain, Outlines of Indian Legal History, pp. 405–414. There still needs to
be written a sufficiently nuanced and comprehensive ideological and institutional
history of the Law Commissions. For a useful discussion focussed on criminal law, see
Elizabeth Kolsky, ‘Codification and the Rule of Colonial Difference’.
72 Anglo-Indians.
73 Copies of the Special Reports of the Indian Law Commissioners, Parliamentary
Papers, House of Commons (henceforth PP) 1842, (585) XXX, pp. 227–866, V ‘Power
of a master over his slave’.
74 ‘On the petitions of the East Indians and Armenians, B VIII, ibid., p. 671.
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Even if this declaration was made, it still remained unclear, given
that the supremely tolerant English legal system had undertaken to
dispenseMuslim andHindu law, what rights accrued to a person when
the Hindu or Muslim laws appeared to indict him or her, for offences
particular to those laws. Was there an area of civility outside religion?
In 1830, Governor-General William Bentinck, with instructions from
the Court of Directors, was determined to establish that there was,
especially where the civil rights of Indian converts to Christianity were
concerned.75 To this end, he legislated Regulation VII of 1832 of the
Bengal Code, of which Section IX provided:
in any civil suit, the parties to such suit may be of different persuasions,
when one party shall be of the Hindoo, and the other of the Mahomedan
persuasion, or where one or more parties to the suit shall not be either of
the Mahomedan or Hindoo persuasions, the law of those religions shall not
be permitted to operate to deprive such party or parties of any property to
which, but for the operation of such laws, they would have been entitled.76
If this had any effect in Bengal, it obviously had none in other
Presidencies, where it did not apply. But an evangelical Anglican
Bishop of Bombay thought the form of the law worth pursuing, and
hence, between 1845 and 1849, Reverend Thomas Carr, repeatedly
wrote to the Government of Bombay, remonstrating against the
British government’s failure to protect converts to Christianity from
loss of civil rights, and especially from being disinherited. He proposed
that the Bengal Regulation be extended to all parts of India.77
When the then current law member, J.D. Bethune, considered such
a possibility, he wondered whether it would be valid to prescribe
automatic transfer of property whose inheritance was tied to certain
conditions. Conditional bequests and entailed estates were well known
in English law, and it could be argued that Hindu inheritance was
similarly dependant upon the fulfilment of certain conditions, among
them the performance of funerary rites for the deceased, a function
which the convert was incapable of fulfilling due to loss of caste.78 But
the Bengal Regulation seemed to have already severed the connection
75 The Vice-President in Council to the Court of Directors, Letter 393, 3 January
1832, in C. H. Philips (ed.), The Correspondence of Lord William Cavendish Bentinck, II:
748–751.
76 ‘Regulations passed by Governments of Bengal, Fort-St.-George and Bombay,
1832’, PP, 1833 (755) XXV, pp. 352–353.
77 Letter from Bishop of Bombay to Governor of Bombay, 28 March 1849, India
Legislative Consultations, 11 April 1850, no. 57 (unpaginated), P/207/59, APAC.
78 Minutes of members of Council, Ibid., no. 59.
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between Hindu doctrine and inheritance—or had it? When consulted,
the judges of Calcutta’s Sadr Diwani Adalat79 stated that they knew
of no cases being argued under the Bengal Regulation, and the Sadr
Diwani Adalat of the North-West Provinces could only refer to one case
of which they provided no details.80
Meanwhile, government received volumes of angry criticism from
the Hindus of Calcutta and Madras. The conservative Hindu leader
Radhakanta Deb stated that the Bengal Regulation had been
completely unknown to him, and that the law was an invasion of
Hindu laws of inheritance. Strongly reacting to the suggestion that
they were being as intolerant, Deb and his co-petitioners argued that
Hindus were the most tolerant of people since they had little interest
in proselytization. All they asked for was protection of their own rules
of inheritance, which was a religious matter, and long recognized by
the government.81
This particular debate was crucial enough to extend right up to the
British Parliament, with the Conservative M.P. Lord Ellenborough,
ex-Governor-General of India, representing the Hindu conservative
view, also adding the more palatable and comprehensible (to a
British audience) gloss that Hindu inheritance laws helped to exclude
immoral persons from familial estates.82 One person who took great
offence at such insinuation was a Bengali Hindu teacher, who had
converted to Christianity in 1832, suffered greatly in his personal and
professional life as a result, and later been ordained with Anglican
orders.83 Reverend Krishna Mohan Banerjea argued that it was a
simple matter of conflict of laws, in which, by established rules, the
laws of the defendant were to be used. Since the Christian convert was
likely to be the defendant against his or her relatives, it was Christian
personal law that ought to be applied.84 Radhakanta Deb, who had
79 Highest civil ‘Company’ court in a province.
80 Ibid., Nos 61–64.
81 The Memorial of the Hindoo Inhabitants of Bengal, Behar and Orissa to the
Governor-General of India inCouncil against the ProposedAct for altering theHindoo
Law of Inheritance (Calcutta: Englishman Press, 1850), printed pamphlet, Ibid.,
no. 80.
82 K. M. Banerjea, Remarks on the Speech of the Earl of Ellenborough in the House of Lords,
on the Bengal Petition against Act XXI of 1850 of the Government of India (Calcutta: R.C.
Lepage & Co., 1853), pp. 3–6. Banerjea summarized Ellenborough’s speech before
making his comments.
83 Ramachandra Ghosha, A Biographical Sketch of the Rev. K.M. Banerjea: Missionary,
Scholar, Patriot (2nd edn, Calcutta, 1980), pp. 14–22.
84 K. M. Banerjea, Remarks on the Speech of the Earl of Ellenborough, p. 14.
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been a patron of Krishna Mohan in his pre-Christian youth, and had
since become a vicious enemy, spat back the crucial question: what
personal laws did Christians in India have?85
Radha Kanta Deb had located the crux of the problem: there was
no Christian personal law, and Indian Christians, particularly those
who had converted to Christianity, were located in an indeterminate
zone by being excluded from the realms of Hindu, Muslim or the
(emerging) Parsi laws by their religion, and from automatic entry into
English law by their race. If Hindu law was to apply to Hindus alone,
and if inheritable property devolved (among Indians) by religious law,
then what law applied to the Indian who had ceased to be Hindu,
or Muslim, or Parsi? Lord Dalhousie’s Government declared that the
state had complete authority to control succession to property, Act
XXI of 1850 declaring that ‘no person would suffer loss of rights he
otherwise possessed because of a loss of caste’.86 The consequences
of this declaration were more complex than most historians have
realized. It certainly did not imply an uncomplicated assertion of the
sovereign right to regulate the transfer of property and responsibility
to protect against civil injury for religious belief.87 But neither was
this declaration of universal intent completely hollowed by state
imperatives to retain ascriptive status in law in general88 or, in
particular, its need to protect the Hindu social order.89 While there
were indeed powerful Indian voices seeking the ear and arm of the
colonial regime to sustain, or (as Washbrook has suggested) create
‘traditional’ social orders, there remained the search for the universal,
which, however muted, added a dynamic to the system. The historical
role of the Indian Christians was not just to expose the hollowness of
the unsubstantiated universal, but also to incite a quest for making it
more substantive.
The declaration of lex loci by Act XXI of 1850 did not, in spite of all
its bluster, provide clear answers to the questions raised in debates
85 A Reply to K.M. Banerjea’s Remarks on the Speech of the Earl of Ellenborough in the House
of Lords delivered on the 26th of May 1853 against the Act XXI of 1850 of the Government of
India. By a Member of the Committee appointed by the Hindu inhabitants of Bengal, Behar and
Orissa, for Petitioning Parliament against the aforesaid Act. (Calcutta, P.S. D’Rozario and
Co., 1853).
86 India Legislative Consultations, 9 April 1850, No. 86.
87 Thomas Metcalf, Aftermath of Revolt, pp. 27–28.
88 Even if these statuses were themselves the product of evolving political and social
relations, as Washbrook argued in his ‘Law, State and Agrarian Society’.
89 Chandra Mallampalli, Christians and Public Life, pp. 21–37.
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betweenBengali Christians andBengaliHindus in the years preceding
the legislation. In effect, Act XXI was a negative law, prohibiting
discrimination, not providing a rule for regulating inheritance where
religious status was in dispute. Ironically, the inconclusiveness of such
a legal declaration is demonstrated in the case related below which
involved no ‘converts’, but only a warring family that was entirely
Christian.
Could Christians be Hindus if they wanted to? Abraham versus
Abraham, 1863
The case of Abraham versus Abraham was in many senses representative
of a wide range of Indian society, and not Christians alone. It involved
familial conflicts over property following the death of a male member,
including efforts by surviving male relatives to exclude the widow
and children of the deceased, and the use of competing claims based
around religious status. But the distinctive feature of this case was
that all parties belonged formally to the same religion: Christianity.
The case revealed how certain individuals within the highly diverse
social group of Indian Christians adeptly manipulated their multiple
affiliations, as well as the increasingly dominant equation ofChristians
with converts, in order tomaximize their individual benefits. In amore
abstract sense, the case showed that declaring non-discrimination on
religious grounds as the lex loci did not help close the continuing conflict
between difference and universality, but added further conduits for
passage between both legal ideas.
The case itself was a sordid one involving efforts by the brother
of a dead man to deprive the latter’s widow and sons of any benefit
from his substantial property. In 1855, Charlotte Abraham, widow of
Matthew, complained in the Civil Court of Bellary, in present day
Karnataka, that Francis Abraham, the surviving brother, a junior
partner in the business during Abraham’s lifetime, and subsequently
the de facto manager, was depriving her and her sons of property and
profits related to her husband’s business. Francis retorted that since
his family were descendants of Hindus, Matthew Abraham’s property
devolved upon him by Hindu inheritance laws of joint family property,
the widow being entitled merely to maintenance. The main point to
be decided during the judicial proceedings was the applicable law. It
was clear that being Christian did not entail any particular law as
far as property was concerned, therefore, Hindu law could be applied
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if the family appeared to be Hindu in practice. The Bellary Civil
Judge’s decision denied Francis’s claims, which was reversed by the
Sadr Diwani Adalat of Madras, and overturned again by the Privy
Council. The highest judicial body of the British empire decided in
1863 that Matthew, on marrying Charlotte, who was ‘East Indian’
had adopted ‘East Indian’ customs, which were similar to those of the
English,90 and hence revealed no inclination to retain Hindu customs,
even though he might have done so.91
This case has received attention from two scholars in recent
times, but unlike them, I have not found this case an occasion
to celebrate open-ended constructions of Indian Christian identity
without reference to their gendered implications,92 nor to discover
arbitrary manipulation of religious or racial identities by the
British government.93 I find the case symptomatic of the categorical
disjunction at which IndianChristians were located, which allowed the
combination of the universalist premise of the lex loci and the trope of
the ‘convert’ for patriarchal interests. But this was not the end of the
story.
The Indian Succession Act, 1865
The Abraham case remained valid precedent for less than two years.
While the law lords discussed the status of the people in the Abraham
family, the third Law Commission of India was working (in Britain)
on an Indian Civil Code, with the law member, Henry Maine, leading
the efforts in India. Unlike the Penal Code, promulgated in 1860,
the Civil Code of India was never completed, with the fourth and
last commission declaring that it was a matter that depended on
the will of the ‘native communities’ themselves.94 What remained
90 After much petitioning, and several reversals, rather than through a simple
assumption of racial similarity. The Vice-President in Council to the Court of
Directors, Letter 393, 3 January 1832, in C. H. Philips (ed.), The Correspondence of Lord
William Cavendish Bentinck, pp. 748–751;Memorial of the Undersigned Christian Inhabitants
of the Presidencies of Bengal and Agra, Chiefly Descended from British-born Subjects of the Crown
on the Father’s Side and on the Mother’s from Natives of India; also of the Christian Foreigners,
and their Descendants, Settled in the British Possessions in India, now Governed by the East India
Company (Calcutta, 1850).
91 Abraham v. Abraham, Moore’s India Appeals, Vol. 9 (1863), pp.195–255.
92 Chandra Mallampalli, Christians and Public Life, pp. 38–58.
93 Gauri Viswanathan, Outside the Fold, pp. 111–117.
94 Report of the Indian Law Commission, 1879 (Calcutta, 1880), pp. 9–18.
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of this old ‘uniform civil code’ project was a unified judicial system,
abolishing the conflicting jurisdictions of the Company and Crown
Courts, a law of Civil Procedure, and certain laws bearing the proud
title ‘Indian’, recalling the (failed) agenda of universalism from which
they were born. One such law was the Indian Succession Act X of 1865
which, on the face of it, purported to be a uniform inheritance law for
India. In reality, the law applied to very few Indians, since Hindus
and Muslims were totally exempted from its provisions, and Parsis
from the provisions of intestate succession.95 Given these exemptions,
the law applied to those whose indeterminate legal status had often
in the past invoked the search for the universal, namely the Indian
Christians.96
The government of India did investigate whether the law could
be applied to all Indians, seeking the opinion of prominent Indians
from all over the country.97 Parsis, who had been collectively working
on their own marriage and inheritance laws, accepted the section
on wills only.98 Prominent Muslim leaders, including none less than
Sayyid Ahmad Khan, rejected the law entirely, on the basis that the
rules of Muslim intestate succession were known, and that their own
laws regarding wills limited testamentary capacity to one-third of the
estate, in absence of the unanimous consent of the ordinary successors.
This varied from the total testamentary power contemplated under
the Indian Succession Act. In addition, Sayyid Ahmad pointed out that
since theQuran recognized oral wills, the Indian SuccessionAct, which
made registration of wills compulsory, would be an invasion of Muslim
religious laws.99
95 Act X of 1865 Indian Succession Act, and connected papers, in India Bills,
Objects and Reasons, Part 3, 1865, L/PJ/5/7, APAC.
96 I do not agree with Mallampalli that the application of this law to Indian
Christians revealed the misguided British belief that those who shared their religion
would be apt recipients of British law. The process worked in the reverse: the Indian
Succession Act aimed to be a universal law, applied to those for whom specific
exemptions had not been made.
97 Government of India Legislative Proceedings, 22 August 1865, No. 41, pp.
924–926, P/208/11; Government of India Legislative Proceedings, 8 February 1866,
No. 8, pp. 49–50, 19 April 1866, No. 6, pp. 118–143, P/436/53, APAC.
98 William Griffith, The Indian Succession Act: Hindu Wills Act, Parsi Succession Act,
Mahometan Succession and Probate and Administration Act, with the other Acts and rules
regulating the disposition and devolution of property of death and with commentaries thereon
and forms used in practice (Madras: Higginbotham & Co., 1898).
99 Government of India Legislative Proceedings, 19April 1866, No. 6, pp. 126–128,
P/436/53, APAC.
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Hindu respondents similarly did not need to contend with intestate
succession, andmany argued thatHindu lawdid not countenancewills,
since the share of inheritance was pre-ordained. This was contradicted
by the fact that Hindu wills were in evidence aplenty in India from
the late-eighteenth century onwards in colonial Indian courts. The
law member, Fitzjames Stephen, took this to mean that Hindus had
admitted to the non-religious status of wills, and that Hindu wills
were a mere derivation from the English example, therefore open
to regulation by government. Accordingly, the Hindu Wills Act was
passed in 1870, extending the section on testamentary succession
in the Indian Succession Act to them. But in response to pressure
from prominent Hindus, including the British Indian Association, the
Hindu Wills Act incorporated several additional privileges, such as
the ability to divert property to religious and charitable purposes,
without the year’s notice required by the Indian Succession Act,100
which remained a powerful tool in the hands of disgruntled parents.
It was not as if Indian Christians were particularly eager to embrace
the succession law modelled on English law, especially since it gave
one-third of the male intestate’s property to his widow, and equal
shares of the residue to daughters and sons, excluding the joint
family consisting of male agnates. The Abraham case at least showed
that there was a difference of opinion on the subject. But men like
Francis Abraham, who would be happy enough to claim the Hindu
law of inheritance (especially mitakshara, which excluded females),
could not really argue that, as Christians, they possessed an older
law of inheritance. The possibility of claiming multiple religious and
hence legal statuses (as with Abraham) went against the grain of the
personal law system, hence all those for whom specific exemptions
were not made were subject to the Indian Succession Act. The irony
was that by sheer delimitation, this ‘universal law’ became a personal
100 By Section 105 of the Indian Succession Act: ‘No man having a nephew or
niece or any nearer relative shall have power to bequeath any property to religious
or charitable uses, except by a will executed not less than twelve months before his
death, and deposited within six months from its execution in some place provided
by law for the safe custody of the wills of living persons.’ William Griffith, The Indian
Succession Act, pp. 67–68. For a record of the efforts of the Government of India to
extend a homogenous law of wills to all Indians, and a predictable disintegration of the
effort through the preservation of special privileges for and constraints upon Hindu
andMuslim testators, seeGovernment of India Legislative Proceedings, August 1870,
Nos 56–111, pp. 79–131, P/436/58, APAC.
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law of inheritance for Indian Christians.101 Many Christians took this
development to be opposed to their interests. TheAll IndiaConference
of IndianChristians, formed in1914, complained vociferously that this
statute denied them of their full rights under Hindu inheritance laws,
in spite of the Lex Loci Act of 1850.102
Christian marriage: from a British civil law to a novel
personal law, 1852
Unlike legislation regarding inheritable property, legislation for
Christian marriage in India originated in problems perceived purely
as ‘British’. However, as soon as the process of legislationwas initiated,
it was discovered that taking Christian marriage to be entirely within
the realm of British domestic life and British law was an unsustainable
proposition which conflicted with the complex legal and social reality
of India. Dealing with this reality led back to the fraught issue of
racial status, as well as the civil rights of those who had converted
to Christianity. In spite of government being made aware of these
issues, theBritish Parliament, in providing a coherentmarriage law for
‘British subjects’ in British colonies and abroad, took only tangential
note of those Indians who would be affected by it. Once legislated, the
Indian (Christian) Marriage Act(s) had such disruptive consequence
for Indian Christians that the government was forced to repeatedly
legislate in order to ‘fix’ problems which were of its own creation. In
analyzing this process, one is made deeply aware of the limitation
of British legal concepts, when religion did not correspond with, but
undermined notions of, racial distinctiveness. It also points to the
effects of a state-centric regulation of difference, in the context of
101 Many Christians continued to claim access to Hindu inheritance law, as in Tellis
versus Saldanha, Indian Law Reports, (1886) 10Mad. 69–73, where it was denied, and
in Francis Ghosal versus Gabri Ghosal, Indian Law Reports (1907) 31 Bombay 25–31,
where it was accepted. But it remained applicable for Indian Christians who could
not secure express exemption, on the basis of customary practices, such as, among
others, the Christians of Coorg, and Punjab. Flavia Agnes, Law and Gender Inequality:
the Politics of Women’s Rights in India (New Dehi, 1999), pp. 148–14; A.C. Ghose, The
Indian Succession Act (Act XXXIX of 1925), (Calcutta: M.C. Sarkar & Sons, 1926),
pp. 11–12.
102 S. C. Mukerji, ‘Law regarding Indian Christians’ in The Report of the Third Session
of the All India Conference of Indian Christians, held in Madras, December 1916, (Madras,
1917), pp. 40–47, United Theological College Archives, Bangalore.
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totalizing regimes of modern law for which the ‘family’ was a state
concern.
The origin of the problems that led to the first Christian marriage
law in India, lay in Britain, and the nature of the British state-
church relationship as it stood in the early nineteenth century. Canon
law recognized marriages that were no more than declarations of
intent in the present tense, even without the presence of witnesses,
but by the sixteenth century, British courts took the view that the
presence of a priest in ‘holy orders’ was essential for the complete
validity of a marriage.103 Following the scandals involving indiscreet
marriages of the wealthy, often performed in secret by ‘rogue’ priests,
Lord Hardwicke’s Act of 1753104 outlawed all marriages not duly
celebrated, ministered and registered in an Anglican church or
chapel, with five exceptions: the Archbishop’s licence, royal marriages,
marriages abroad (provided such marriage were celebrated by a law
that recognized Christian marriage), marriages between Jews, and
those between Quakers.105 Although the above law did not apply
to Scotland, there arose doubts regarding the validity of marriages
performed by ministers of the Scottish church in India, and hence a
specific legislation in 1818 permitted such marriages provided such
ministers were also chaplains of the East India Company.106
This still left a significant number of people ‘out in the cold’,
and these happened to be Nonconformist missionaries, whose deeply
held religious views made it unlikely that they would take such an
‘establishment’107 view of religion and marriage lying down. Since
they proceeded to exercise what in their view were their ministerial
duties, by performing marriages when invited to do so, the (Anglican)
Bishop of Calcutta, Daniel Wilson, complained to the Governor-
General of India in 1833 that law of marriage had been disturbed
by such activities, and that the law should be clearly settled, because
it affected ‘all the bonds of moral and domestic happiness, spreading
103 This caused certain problems for Jews and Quakers, whose religious tenets did
not include priests. H.S. Q. Henriques ‘Jewish Marriages and the English Law’ in The
Jewish Quarterly Review, Vol. 20, No. 3 (April, 1908), pp. 391–449.
104 An Act for the better prevention of clandestine marriage, 26 Geo. II c. 23 of
1753.
105 The Clauses providing the exceptions were 6, 17 and 18.
106 An Act to remove doubts as to the validity of certain marriages had and
solemnized within the British territories in India, 1818, 58 Geo. III c. 84.
107 In the sense of a privileged legal relationship between a particular church and
the state, such as the Anglican church in England, and at the time, in Wales and
Ireland as well.
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in its consequences to every branch of the social, civil, and religious
relations of families, and involving the rights of property and the
order of legitimacy and succession.’ In the Bishop’s view, in natural
law, marriage was considered a contract between two individuals even
without the intervention of any other party, but to be valid in a civil
society, marriage had to be regulated by law, and in a Christian
country, it had to be further sanctified by a vow to God. Marriage
valid in ecclesiastical law had to consist of all three of these aspects—
and such was the law that governed British subjects. Hence, in the
Bishop’s opinion, the Nonconformist ministers had broken the law,
which was deplorable, given that they claimed to be missionaries of
religion.108
Nonconformist ministers themselves took quite a different view,
unsurprisingly, and petitioned the Governor-General for a law
that would validate marriages performed by ‘Protestant dissenting’
ministers, which the Government of India forwarded to the Court of
Directors of the East India Company.109 At this stage, Bishop Wilson
stated sharply that he failed to appreciate the scruples of dissenting
ministers, and indeed how was a dissenting minister—his faith, creed
and competence—defined? Could a Socinian, denying the Divinity of
our Lord, or a mere printer or schoolmaster be counted as a dissenting
minister, and stand in the place of a priest in holy orders?110
Bishop Wilson, who is known for his Evangelical rather than for his
high church views,111 took in this case a slightly dated approach to the
issue of marriage laws and their establishment: in 1836 in Britain, in
response to demands byNonconformists, a lawwas enacted permitting
civil marriage before a Registrar for those who had conscientious
objections to being married in an Anglican church.112 Although in
108 Lord Bishop of Calcutta to the Governor-General, 21 August 1833, in Royal
Commission to inquire into State and Operation of Law of Marriages, PP 1850 (1203) XX,
pp. 363–430, at pp. 391–395.
109 Legislative Council, Calcutta, to the Court of Directors, 3 December 1838,
forwarding the petition of the Dissenting Ministers, Nos 6–7, in ibid., pp. 400–401.
110 Letter from the Bishop of Calcutta to the President in Council, 30 January
1839, No. 15, in ibid., pp. 405–40.
111 For his support of missions to India, in particular to the Church Missionary
Society, andhis personal enthusiasm for the conversion of Indians, see JosiahBateman,
The Life of the Rt. Rev. Daniel Wilson (2 vols., London, 1860).
112 Marriage Act 1836, 6 & 7Will. IV c. 85. For some indication of Nonconformist
politics andAnglican clerical opposition preceding this legislation, seeOliveAnderson,
‘The Incidence of Civil Marriage in Victorian England and Wales’ in Past and Present,
69 (November 1975), pp. 50–87.
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the Bishop’s opinion, this law was a failure, a Special Parliamentary
Commission, appointed to decide on the issue (considered to be of
empire-wide concern), used it as amodel for what was in reality India’s
first civil marriage law.
So far, it might appear as if this was a conflict entirely within
the remit of British Church history, or at least within the history of
sectarian politics within a strictly British context. But the introductory
clause of the law intended to regulate ‘marriages in India’ belied the
insularity that characterized the text of the law itself; by restricting
its jurisdiction to marriages where at least one party professed to
be of ‘Christian religion’, this law, which claimed a territorial scope
in its title, exposed the manner in which religion was embedded in
the category of ‘British subject’, for whom it was primarily intended.
This religious qualifier served to simultaneously exclude the majority
of Indians from its scope, and at the same time, include those people
whose history has been to destabilize the secure separations of law and
races. The commission was aware that there were Europeans in India
who were Christians but who were not provided for, as there were
East Indians, the latter being accommodated by considering them
as being ‘British subjects’. The most thorny problem, being the law
regulating the marriages of those who had converted to Christianity
from Hinduism or Islam, and who were in many cases repudiated by
their spouses, was considered in great detail, but declared to be beyond
the competence of the Commission, which decided to recommend a
law only for the marriage of ‘British subjects’, however obscure the
category.113
The Act for Marriages in India, legislated in 1851114 embodied
the efforts of the Commission, and produced the paradox of a
confessionally-limited civil law, whereby parties of whom at least one
was Christian, if they fulfilled the necessary conditions of minimum
age (and/or consent of guardian), absence of a living spouse, and not
being related within prohibited degrees, could, after due notice to the
Marriage Registrar, have a purely civil marriage. The Government of
India protested that the requirement of parental consent to marriage
until the age of 21 would discriminate against Indian Christians, who
might not have a congenial guardian115 (since their aggrieved parents
113 Report of the Royal Commission to inquire into State and Operation of Law of Marriages,
pp. 367–370.
114 An Act for Marriages in India, 14 & 15 Vic. Cap. XL of 1851.
115 Judicial Letters from India, 1852, pp. 171–173, L/PJ/3/291, APAC.
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were unlikely to offer consent) and be forced to postpone marriage
until they were 21 (exceptionally late for marriage in nineteenth-
century India). The authorities in Britain failed to be moved by the
exotic difficulties of their Indian co-religionists, and the Government
of India was forced to enact Act V of 1852, replicating the British
Parliamentary law. This law referred to Indian Christians only in
passing: clauses 7 and 12 providing that ‘native Christians’ marrying
under this law were to be made aware of the obligations arising out
of it, most importantly that of monogamy. This reference presaged
the sad fate of Zabardast Khan, included in the scope of law because
he straddled classificatory categories incapable of comprehending the
reality of his life.
From Indian Marriage Act to Indian Christian Marriage Act:
the sacralization of a civil law, 1864–1872
Act V of 1852 in itself did not causemuch concern to IndianChristians
or to the missionaries who ministered to them, since most Indian
Christians married in Church and remained unaffected by legal
provisions for civil marriage.
But in 1864, once again as part of its uniform civil code project, the
Government of India attempted to create a ‘universal’116 marriage law
for India encompassing civil as well as Church marriages. This time, it
caused uproar among missionaries, especially Roman Catholic priests
from Madras presidency, who found that several of the provisions
of proposed law conflicted with their established practices. The
several offending aspects of Act XXV of 1864 included prescriptions
regarding the performance of marriage ceremonies within daylight
hours, the prohibited degrees of kinship, and also that of minimum
age of the parties (thirteen for women and sixteen for men), and the
requirement of parental consent where parties to a marriage were
below the minimum age.117
Because of Catholic protests, the new Indian Marriage Act, V of
1865 made further modifications to the laws regulating Christian
116 Read: ‘by exclusion Christian’.
117 Act XXV of 1864 and related papers have so far proved untraceable in the India
Office Records; it appears that they were lent to the Colonial Office for reference.
The present account is based on the papers relating to Act V of 1865, which described
the failings of the previous law.
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marriages in India. Following recommendations from the Madras
government,118 it removed the requirement of parental consent for all
‘native Christians’ (not only converts), and entirely exempted Roman
Catholic marriages from the application of Part 5 which dealt with
the conditions under which a marriage between ‘native Christians’
was valid:
That the bride was at least thirteen and the groom sixteen,
That they should not be within prohibited degrees of consanguinity or affinity,
That neither should have a spouse living,
That they take the marriage vow in a certain form, before two witnesses,
And that the marriage should be celebrated within daylight hours.
But even with Roman Catholics (seemingly) out of the picture,119
the Indian Marriage Act needed further modifications before it could
accommodate the requirements of Indian Christians. A now venerable
Reverend Krishna Mohan Banerjea, as President of the Bengal
Christian Association, complained bitterly against the removal of the
requirement of parental consent for marriages of Christian minors.
He urged that this left Indian Christian children as unprotected as
orphans, liable to be misled into inappropriate marriages. Converts
might require unusual freedom from parental control, but in his view,
the children of converts certainly did not. In the final version of the
marriage law of Christians in 1872, which retained the minimum
ages of thirteen and sixteen, the requirement of parental consent was
re-added until the age of 21.120
Debates over a statutory minimum age of marriage and marital
relations exercised over significant sections of the Indian public from
the late-nineteenth century until well into the twentieth century. In
their legal form these debates often replicated the apparent binary of
natural law and religious law. It was the government’s responsibility
as well as its right to offer protection to vulnerable sections of Indian
society, in this case, young girls, being evaluated against the doctrinal
requirements of Hinduism and Islam, as well as the entitlement of
Indians to protect their domestic space against encroachment by a
118 Government of Fort St George to Government of India, 17 January 1865, in
Indian Marriage Act V of 1865 and connected papers, Government of India, Bills and
Acts, 1865, Part 3, L/PJ/5/7, APAC.
119 Although subsequent discussion over divorce would reveal that their exemption
was of unsure implication.
120 ‘Indian Marriage Act, 1872 and related papers’ in Government of India, Bills
and Acts, 1872 Part III, L/PJ/5/16, APAC.
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state being increasingly vilified as alien.121 In the Christian context,
the debate took a different shape, with the ‘universal’ ideals of freedom
(from religious or parental control) serving, unlike in the Hindu
and Muslim context, to justify a lowering of the age of marriage.
In conceptualizing the Indian Christian as essentially a convert from
other religions, legislation sought to pre-empt punitive constraints
that such religions might impose on the person exercising religious
choice. But such a conflation of ‘Christian’ with ‘convert’ and of
‘parental control’ with ‘hostile religious prescription’ threatened to
undermine the age and gender hierarchies within Christian families.
Krishna Mohan’s complaints have to be seen in this context. Being a
‘convert’ seemed unfairly to preclude being a sufficiently authoritative
father.
Christian monogamy and the travails of Indian Christians: the
Native Converts’ Marriage Dissolution Act, 1866
We are now poised on the brink of explaining Zabardast Khan’s failure
to establish his status as a husband, in any law, whether Muslim
or universal/Christian. As the British Parliamentary Commission
was already aware in 1850, the most numerically substantial legal
problem with regard to Christian marriage in India was the fact of
religious change. They had examined with great curiosity the informal
procedures adopted by missionaries in dealing with the thorny
personal and marital dilemmas to which conversion to Christianity
gave rise—learning that missionaries did not view conversion to
Christianity as an end to the pre-Christian marriage, although this
view was most often unreciprocated by the non-Christian spouse.
Lengthy procedures were established, prohibiting re-marriage of the
convert before adequate communication and persuasion had been
121 These debates spilled over into a number of widely divergent ideological
concerns, in which, as scholars have shown, the real experiences of women were
treated as no more than the turf for male contests. See Tanika Sarkar, ‘Conjugality
and Hindu Nationalism: Resisting Colonial Reason and the Death of a Child-Wife’ in
Tanika Sarkar, Hindu Wife, Hindu Nation: Community, Religion and Cultural Nationalism
(London: Hurst & Co., 2001), pp. 191–225; Mrinalini Sinha, Colonial Masculinity: the
‘Manly’ Englishman and the ‘Effeminate’ Bengali in the Late Nineteenth Century (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1995); Sudhir Chandra, Enslaved Daughters: Colonialism,
Law and Women’s Rights (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998).
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attempted, extending over a period of two to three years, only after
which the convert was permitted to re-marry in church.122
Such church procedure of effecting divorces continued, in spite of
the Commission’s refusal to formalize it, but surfaced again within
the range of official vision only when it was legally proscribed. The Act
for Marriages in India, 1851 had prohibited marriage for Christians
(including ‘native’ Christians) with a living spouse. And from 1852
onwards, the Government of India began receiving petitions from
Indian converts to Christianity, complaining about their inability to
remarry when deserted123 by their non-Christian spouses. But since
the Act of 1851 dealt merely with civil marriages, it affected very
few. However, with the extension of the same conditions to church
marriages with the Indian Marriage Acts of 1864 and 1865, Indian
Christians, and those concerned with their spiritual welfare, found
themselves in a quandary. With the passage of these laws, Christians
who were already married committed the criminal offence of bigamy
if they married again, even if their spouses had repudiated them, as
was often the case with converts to Christianity. This gave Indian
Christians, or at least Indian Christian men, an unwanted legal
distinction, since polygamy was not illegal for any other category
of Indian men.124 This situation, which would practically force the
new convert to be celibate until the death of his/her spouse, was
represented by Protestant and Catholic missionaries all over the
country with great vigour as inequitable, and by the end of 1865, the
Government of India had compiled an immense dossier of petitions,
which requested a law permitting the dissolution of non-existent
marriages in which Indian converts to Christianity remained trapped,
a demand occasioned by the provisions of the most recent marriage
law.125
122 Minutes of Evidence given by David Hill, of the Judicial Department of the East
India Company, in Report of the Royal Commission to inquire into State and Operation of Law
of Marriages, pp. 379–381.
123 But not divorced, since there was no divorce law applicable to Christians in
India before 1866.
124 Except Parsis after 1865.
125 Among the earliest petitioners was the Scottish Missionary, John Wilson, who
worked in Bombay, and who referred to his experience with Parsi pupils who had
converted to Christianity. Report of the Select Committee on the Bill to legalize,
under certain circumstances, the re-marriage of native converts to Christianity, and
associated papers, pp. 18–42, Government of India, Bills and Acts, 1866, L/PJ/5/8,
APAC.
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The Government of India was convinced of the justness of this
appeal. Britain had in the very recent past legislated a divorce law,
the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857, but its provisions did not appear
to fit the circumstances, since it focussed on sexual misdemeanour
rather than religious conflict: adultery was a necessary ground for
divorce under this law, on its own for the wife, and combined with
other offences for the husband. Hence an entirely new law was drafted
for India, using a provision from ecclesiastical law—that of suing for
restitution of conjugal rights. Under the proposed law, the deserted
spouse, as plaintiff, would demand the restoration of conjugal rights,
and if the deserting non-Christian partner refused to comply, a divorce
could be granted after the fulfilment of necessary procedures in court.
Most missionaries found the proposed law inconvenient. Reverend
Fennelly, the Catholic bishop of the Madras, urged that the provisions
of the proposed law were unnecessarily complicated and time-
consuming, as well as humiliating for women, since the procedure
required the establishment of the fact of consummation in court.126
He strongly recommended that the Catholic church be permitted to
follow its own canon law procedure for dissolving such marriages,
which it had pursued so far, in India as well as in other countries.127
Taking a completely opposed point of view, urging prohibition rather
than facilitation of divorce, urban Protestant Christian leaders of
Calcutta and Delhi denounced the proposed law on the grounds that
it would prevent reconciliations which in most cases did eventually
take place, and would lead to a loss of opportunity to spread the
Christian message further. Reverend Krishna Mohan Banerjea (once
again) felt that the law was entirely the creation of missionaries who
were totally unrepresentative of Indian Christians and who treated
the latter as their serfs.128 Banerjea was to some extent unfair.
126 Section 18 of the Act as it was passed in 1866 required establishing facts
regarding consummation, which determined subsequent procedure.
127 Government of India Legislative Proceedings, 18 August 1865, No. 39–40, pp.
918–923, P/208/11, APAC. As the case of re Millard showed, the Catholic Church did
insist on going its own way, with occasional adverse results for its members. A Catholic
priest was convicted for abetting bigamywhen he performed themarriage of a paraiyan
(dalit or formerly untouchable caste) woman who had converted to Christianity
in childhood, had married a non-Christian paraiyan man, and was subsequently
abandoned by him. Indian Law Reports, re Millard, (1868) 10 Madras, 218–222.
The case underlined forcefully the modern state’s refusal to recognize alternative
laws and tribunals with jurisdiction over marriage and its dissolution.
128 From the Lord Bishop of Calcutta to the Viceroy of India, forwarding Krishna
MohanBanerjea’s printed pamphlet, as well as letters fromTaraChand andReverend
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Reverend R. Winter of the Anglican Society for the Propagation
of Gospel’s (SPG) mission to Delhi similarly stated that he didn’t
know of any Indian converts ‘panting’ to be re-admitted to marital
life.129 On the other hand, Reverend W.T. Satthianadhan, of Madras,
an Indian clergyman, responded to Banerjea (and Winter) that the
scale of religious conversions in south India made the legal measure
essential, implying that the righteous moral posture of north Indian
and Bengali Christians arose from their being acquainted with an
unrepresentatively small number of conversions.130
There were also petitions from Hindus and Muslims alleging that
the law impinged on their religious rights under law. As a result, a
number of provisions were modified, especially those requiring the
physical presence of deserting wives in court. Muslims managed to
secure a complete exemption from the law, on grounds that it was
unnecessary, since a Muslim marriage was completely dissolved by
apostasy, and also that it was invasive of Muslim personal law, since it
forced the Muslim spouse to postpone re-marriage beyond the period
of probation or iddat under Muslim law.131 This exemption was to lead
to Zabardast Khan’s judicial misfortune in 1870, mentioned at the
beginning of this paper.
The Indian Divorce Act 1869, and the fate of Zabardast Khan
When the Native Converts’ Marriage Dissolution Act XXI of
1866 was passed, it proved incapable of addressing the marital
problems of Indian Christians. The procedural requirements of this
law necessitated that the deserting spouse be produced in court
and subjected to a long process of interrogation and attempts at
reconciliation. Where the spouse was untraceable, as was often the
R. Winter of the S. P. G. mission to Delhi, in, Report of the Select Committee on the
Bill to legalize, under certain circumstances, the re-marriage of native converts to
Christianity, and associated papers, pp. 18–42.
129 Ibid., pp. 43–45.
130 Ibid., pp. 51–54. On Satthianadhan and the history of this illustrious Tamil
Christian family, see E.M. Jackson, ‘Glimpses of a Prominent Indian Christian
Family of Tirunelveli and Madras, 1863–1906: Perspectives on Caste, Culture, and
Conversion’ in R. E. Frykenberg (ed.), Christians and Missionaries in India: Cross-cultural
Communication since 1500 (Michigan: W.B. Ferdmans, 2003), pp. 315–335.
131 ‘Petition of the Mahomedan inhabitants of the town and suburbs of Calcutta’,
in Ibid., pp. 137–141.
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case, the law offered no remedy.132 But the Act of 1866 was not
repealed. Instead, Act IV of 1869, or the Indian Divorce Act, was
legislated to supplement it as well as provide one more ‘universal’
law to complement the Indian Marriage Act. This law extended the
provisions of the (English) Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857, under
which, as we have noted, adulterywas a necessary condition for divorce,
adultery of the wife being sufficient grounds, while adultery of the
husband required additional grievances such as cruelty, desertion or
‘unnatural’ sexual acts.133 This time, the re-marriage ofmale converts’
non-Christian wives was deemed equivalent to adultery. Similar
behaviour by the non-Christian husbands of Christian women had
to be construed differently, since English law did not as yet consider
adultery by the husband as sufficient grounds for divorce. If such
a husband had once been Christian, but had changed his religion, in
order to re-marry, the combination of religious change and remarriage
provided grounds for divorce.134 No relief was contemplated for
the Christian woman whose repudiating husband had never been
Christian, apart fromwhat the Native Converts’ Marriage Dissolution
Act of 1866 could offer.
And so we find Zabardast Khan filing a suit for divorce, under the
Indian Divorce Act, after his wife deserted him and Christianity for a
Muslim husband and Islam. As mentioned at the beginning of this
paper, Khan did not win his case, because the High Court judge
decided that Khan’s ‘Muslim marriage’ could not be dissolved under
the Indian Divorce Act, which was intended for Christian, or at least
monogamous marriages, not potentially polygamous ones. Neither
could Khan use the older Native Converts’ Marriage Dissolution Act,
132 This was pointed out by a judge from Dhaka, referring to a case where the
deserting wife of a Christian convert had, subsequent to leading a ‘dissolute’ life,
disappeared without trace. Under-Secretary to Government of India to Officiating
Secretary Government of Bengal, 9th September 1868, acknowledging receipt of
the letter with enclosure, Government of India Legislative Proceedings 1868, 12
September, No. 6, p. 274, P/436/55, APAC.
133 On the British divorce law, see J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal
History (3rd edn, London: Butterworths, 1990), pp. 567–568; Lawrence Stone, Road to
Divorce: England1530–1987 (Oxford:Clarendon,1990), pp.353–390;OliveAnderson,
‘Hansard’s Hazards: an Illustration from Recent Interpretations of MarriedWomen’s
Property Law and the 1857 Divorce Act’ in The English Historical Review, Vol. 112, No.
449 (November 1997), pp. 1202–1215.
134 Henry Rattigan, The Law of Divorce Applicable to Christians in India (the Indian
Divorce Act) (2nd edn, Lahore: Unniversal Book Agency, 1936), p. 105. This provision
was specific to Indian law, with no counterpart in British law, since under British law
a second marriage was necessarily a criminal offence.
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since deserting Muslim spouses (such as his wife) were expressly
exempted from its provisions. It will be recalled that when exempting
Muslims from the Native Converts’ Marriage Dissolution Act XXI
of 1866, the government had been convinced that Muslim marriages
were dissolved by the conversion of any one spouse. This remained
the view of the Muslim legal specialist consulted in this case, but that
did not help Khan, since it appeared to the judge that as a Christian,
he was not entitled to benefit from the provisions of Muslim personal
law.135
A similar decisionwas reached by theMadrasHighCourt inThapitha
Peter versus Thapitha Lakshmi. One of the three judges in that case
was Muthusamy Aiyar, the first Indian to be appointed to the High
Court in Madras.136 These judges decided that the Indian Divorce
Act did not apply to a Hindu marriage, even if the parties themselves
had both become Christians, because the Indian Divorce Act was not
meant to apply to polygamous marriages (as with Khan) and also
because the court had no jurisdiction to hear matrimonial disputes of
Hindus. Sincematrimonial jurisdiction of theHighCourts was derived
from the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the erstwhile Supreme Courts,
matrimonial causes relating to non-Christian marriages could not be
heard in these courts.137 The principle that the Indian Divorce Act
could not dissolve non-Christian marriages held for at least another
half-century until, in 1912, the Calcutta High Court ruled that, if the
plaintiff was Christian at the time of the suit, the Indian Divorce Act
could apply.138
In the early-twentieth century, a newly-formed Christian (mostly
Protestant) political organization with India-wide membership, called
the All Indian Conference of Indian Christians, voiced animated
complaints against a marriage law that permitted, according to
them, undeterred adultery by Christian women in India.139 I found
this complaint baffling, not least because I found it hard to
135 Zaburdust Khan versus his wife (1870) 2 N.W. 370.
136 M. P. Duraisamy Aiyar, Memories of Sir T. Muthusami Ayyar: First Indian Judge of
the High Court of Madras (Tanjore, n.d. [1912]).
137 Thapitha Peter versus Thapitha Lakshmi, Indian Law Reports (1894), 17 Madras,
pp. 235–246.
138 Henry Rattigan, The Law of Divorce, pp. 34–35.
139 B. N. Athavale, ‘The present law regarding Indian Christians—is legislation
necessary?’, The Report of the First Session of the All India Conference of Indian Christians, held
in Calcutta, December 1914 (Madras, 1915), Appendix I, United Theological College
Archives, Bangalore. Athavale was not aware of the recent Calcutta judgement: it was
pointed out in subsequent meetings of the A.I.C.I.C.
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believe this self-portrayal by Christian men as victimized, constantly
cuckolded husbands. Unless Indian Christian middle-class women
were remarkably unlike middle-class women of other communities,
there was obviously more going on than the political narrative of this
community revealed. An investigation into the actual cases cited led
me into the complex story of religious change, personal and social
conflicts, and legal negotiations narrated above.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have offered answers to two distinct historical
questions, one substantive, the other speculative. The first question is
about the origins ofChristian personal law as a distinct set of judiciable
rules regarding family relations and property, apparently premised
on religion. The second question frames the first, querying how a
notion of confessionally differentiated laws came to be shaped and
applied in colonial India, and how such a legal concept was connected
to specific elements within it, such as Christian personal law. I have
argued that the notion that familial and property relations were the
exclusive jurisdiction of legislative and judicial organs of the state
produced a novel situation in late–eighteenth-century India, as the
British colonial regime shaped itself in Bengal and other peripheral
zones of the declining Mughal empire. Into such a new institutional
and ideological context fed earlier (‘pre-colonial’) British efforts to
legally deal with the fact of religious and cultural differences in
India, and also increasingly more pressing needs to distinguish the
British (the rulers) from those whom they ruled. The distinction and
hierarchization of those who were different within the universalistic
notion of rule of law produced a peculiarly modern state-centred legal
regulation of difference, incomprehensible within Mughal notions of
law and justice.
I have deliberately used the history of (apparently) marginal Indian
groups in order to reveal the ideas and paradoxes that lay beneath the
system of personal laws. It was such groups that forced the colonial
legal regime to reconsider the adequacy of its categorical binaries:
British-native, Hindu-Muslim, and also to search for substantial
means to make the notion of universal civil rights and religious
freedom available to groups that simply did not fit legal typologies.
It is ironic that the result of this quest to resolve difference with
universality, resulted in further differentiating a group of people as
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Indian Christians, for whom an entire personal law appeared to spring
from the earth.
Yet, in spite of the fact that the statutes framing Christian personal
law were legislated in a cluster in a few decades from the mid- to
the late-nineteenth century, this did not reflect the arbitrary and
unilateral will of a colonial regime. In repeatedly referring to the
personal laws as a system, rather than as an aggregation of the
fragments of several religious laws, I have attempted to indicate how
the principle of preservation of Indian laws, and non-interference in
Indian religion, provided a political platform which came to be rapidly
occupied by novel Indian speakers who, in claiming to represent their
religious communities, revealed modern, horizontally conceptualized
and lay-oriented notions of religion and human collectives. The leaders
of such collectives asserted the claims of ‘their’ religions against each
other, as well as against any attempts by the state to create a religion-
neutral legal zone of personal and property rights. It was the historical
role of Christians, who came to be perceived as the rule-breakers of
every community, to provide repeated occasions for evaluating what
remained of the universal project, even if universality in colonial India
ultimately became provincialized into a community’s personal laws.
It has been difficult to write a legal history in which the will of none
of the principal protagonists matched the ultimate outcome. Law has
often been seen as a vehicle of political ideology, or in a more diffuse
sense, of coherent visions of culture and society.
In tracing the story of Christian personal law in India, I have read
several such apparently coherent statements, for example, about the
illegitimacy of individual will in Hindu andMuslim property relations.
In reading these statements, I could not but notice their precise
polemical purpose, and also their connection with less clearly stated
but equally purposeful actions, such as the creation of private Hindu
religious trusts to exclude errant sons, especially those who had dared
to change their religion. Christians themselves projected a variety of
social visions, if their claims in the context of legal disputes can at all
be read as such. While they repeatedly referred to the universalistic
notion of religion-neutral civil rights by invoking the lex loci, they did
so primarily in order to claim connection with a particular personal
law, which often happened to be that version of the Hindu law which
offered disproportionately greater privileges to men than to women.
The result of this inherently competitive process was the Christian
personal law, with its peculiarities, which appear simultaneously
discriminatory against Christian women, and also against Christians
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in general as compared with other religious communities.140 This
paper has attempted to explain these paradoxical features by arguing
that the history of Christian personal law consisted not merely of
systematic discrimination against a religious community, but also of
efforts to define the membership of that ‘community’ and the nature
of inter-personal relations within it, and a persistent quest for
universal legal principles in the midst of acknowledged legal
differences.
140 Such as the requirement to register any bequest to a religious institution a year
in advance, or the loss of custody by a Hindu following conversion.
